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FULFILLING THE PROMISE OF BROWN?
WHAT PARENTS INVOLVED MEANS FOR
LOUISVILLE AND THE FUTURE OF RACE
IN PUBLIC EDUCATION
Meaghan Hines*
INTRODUCTION
In the summer of 2007, the Supreme Court declared unconstitu-
tional the Jefferson County' Board of Education's race-based student-
assignment plan in Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School
District No. 1.2 The decision was both long-awaited and controversial.3
Parents Involved marked the first time that the Roberts Court was given
the opportunity to address the issue of race in public education. The
Court's invalidation of the Seattle and Louisville public school assign-
ment plans demonstrated what some perceived to be the Court's clear
movement to the right, prompting Justice Breyer to declare from the
bench, "It is not often in the law that so few have so quickly changed
so much." 4 This Note explains what Parents Involved means for the
future of race-based student assignment plans. Specifically, Parents
Involved will be examined through the vantage point of the commu-
nity of Louisville, whose leaders have attempted to rework the city's
* Candidate for Juris Doctor, Notre Dame Law School, 2009; B.A., Rhodes
College, 2006. I would like to thank Professor Jennifer Mason McAward for her
invaluable aid in all facets of the Note writing process, as well as my father, Bruce
Hines, for his assistance in the historical research.
1 The city of Louisville is located within the boundaries of Jefferson County,
Kentucky.
2 127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007).
3 The case was the oldest on the docket by the time the opinion was issued, with
oral arguments having been heard on December 4, 2006. Some speculate that the
reason for the delay was an effort by both the plurality and the dissent to edge Justice
Kennedy closer to their respective points of view. See, e.g., Linda Greenhouse, Justices,
5-4, Limit Use of Race for School Integration Plans, N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 2007, at A24.
4 Linda Greenhouse, In Steps Big and Small, Supreme Court Moved Right, N.Y.
TiMES, July 1, 2007, at Al.
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student assignment policy to meet the constitutional guidelines set
out in the decision.
Louisville first implemented its desegregation plan to comply
with Brown v. Board of Education's5 prohibition on separate but equal
public educational facilities. 6 Prior to Brown, Louisville assigned stu-
dents to schools on the basis of race in order to keep schools segre-
gated. After Brown, the city adopted a plan to assign students on the
basis of race in order to integrate schools. Ironically, this plan was
struck down in Parents Involved on principles that seem different from
those espoused in Brown. While Brown sought to achieve integration
by prohibiting discrimination on the basis of race, Parents Involved
essentially forbade integration by what a plurality of the Court inter-
preted to be discrimination on the basis of race. 7 This Note argues
that the legacy of Brown may still be honored after Parents Involved.
Diversity in education is still a compelling interest and may be used to
foster integration. Parents Involved has merely narrowed the circum-
stances in which voluntary educational integration may be achieved.
School districts must be careful to create plans that will pass a strict
scrutiny analysis, taking into consideration such factors as broad con-
cepts of diversity, limited and necessary uses of race, and considera-
tion of race-neutral alternatives.
Before the Court issued its opinion in Parents Involved, Louisville
employed a student assignment plan that used racial percentages to
determine admissions and transfers to public elementary and high
schools. The plan had been lauded as a progressive measure that
allowed children to reap the benefits of a racially diverse learning
environment. 8 However, the policy was not always accepted by the
community. The Jefferson County Board of Education implemented
the policy in the 197 0s after the city was forced to desegregate its pub-
lic school system and was met with widespread disapproval and out-
rage. The city's struggle to integrate and the subsequent changes
made to its desegregation plan are examined in Part I.
5 (Brown 1), 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
6 See infra Part I.
7 See infra Part III.A.
8 See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738,
2776 (2007) (Thomas,J., concurring) ("Supporting the school boards, one amicus has
assured us that 'both early desegregation research and recent statistical and
econometric analyses ... indicate that there are positive effects on minority student
achievement scores arising from diverse school settings.' Another brief claims that
'school desegregation has a modest positive impact on the achievement of African-
American students.'" (alteration in original) (citations omitted)).
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Parents Involved was significant not only for the city of Louisville,
but also for dozens of other communities throughout the nation that
had implemented similar assignment plans under the assumption that
the use of race in such plans was constitutional. This assumption was
based partly on the Supreme Court's established permission for the
use of racial classifications in efforts to integrate or diversify public
education in general, coupled with the lack of any clear opinion on
the permissibility of such classifications in lower education specifically.
Although Parents Involved is the first Supreme Court case to consider
the use of voluntary race-based assignment policies in elementary and
secondary education, it is the latest in a long line of Supreme Court
cases examining the use of race in public education generally. These
decisions laid the groundwork for Parents Involved. Part II traces the
jurisprudence of the Supreme Court from Brown forward, analyzing
the Court's decisions concerning the implementation of desegrega-
tion plans, their limits, and the use of racial classification in higher
education admissions.
Part III analyzes the decision in Parents Involved itself and how the
Roberts Court answered the pertinent constitutional questions
presented in the case. Part IV examines the implications that the
holding created for the future of race in public education. This Part
aims to be especially instructive for secondary and elementary schools.
In particular, it lays out several requirements and prohibitions for
school assignment plans, both explicit and implicit, that can be
gleaned from Parents Involved. It creates an advisory checklist for
school boards to formulate student assignment plans that will pass
muster under current constitutional guidelines. Additionally, it exam-
ines Louisville's response to Parents Involved: what the community is
saying, what its leaders are doing, and what is in store for its students
in the years to come.
The plurality opinion in Parents Involved left many questions
unanswered, particularly how school boards are lawfully to consider
race in determining admissions to public schools. While the deci-
sion's future impact on race in education is not immediately clear,
one can be certain that the Court's opinion in Parents Involved will
have a lasting effect. This Note aims to take a first step in analyzing
that effect, and in answering the questions left unresolved.
I. A LONG ROAD TO BUSING: THE INTEGRATION OF THE JEFFERSON
COUNTY PUBLIC SCHOOL SYSTEM
A full telling of [the history of equal protection as applied to the
public schools in Jefferson County] would begin by describing the
20o8] 2175
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pain, inhumanity, and social degradation caused by state imposed
school segregation. It would describe the individual potential
which segregation suppressed; the spirit and determination of those
who overcame the obstacles it imposed; and the moral strength of
those who fought the legal, social, and political battle against it and
other forms of discrimination. It would necessarily describe the
confusion and outrage at Judge Gordon's busing order which
seemed to tear this community apart as it sent children from their
own neighborhoods to places that many of both races had never
before seen. Finally, it would describe a school community which in
many respects came together for a common purpose and worked at
understanding one another well enough to overcome all these trau-
matic events. In doing so, at the very least, the Jefferson County
schools created something positive and workable. 9
The "positive and workable" system in place in Jefferson County,
Kentucky, at the turn of the twenty-first century came about through
an arduous, explosive, and decades-long struggle. Before the
Supreme Court's landmark decision in of Brown,10 both Louisville and
Jefferson County operated dual school systems by law.'1 Brown's
famous declaration that separate is "inherently unequal" in the con-
text of public education set the stage for desegregation in the city of
Louisville and throughout Jefferson County.12 In the wake of Brown,
Louisville began to integrate its school system in 1956 when its Board
of Education adopted an assignment plan that utilized a geographic
attendance zone and a transfer policy.' 3 In 1959, the city employed a
faculty desegregation plan. 14 Jefferson County likewise began to
desegregate in 1956; from 1956 to 1963, the county eliminated its all-
black schools, and assigned black pupils to county schools by geo-
graphic district.15
However, progress in both districts was slow. In 1972, parents
and students filed two federal class action lawsuits, one against the
9 Hampton v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 72 F. Supp. 2d 753, 755 (W.D. Ky.
1999).
10 For a more in-depth discussion of Brown I, see infra notes 86-88 and accompa-
nying text.
11 See Newburg Area Council, Inc. v. Bd. of Educ., 489 F.2d 925, 927, 929 (6th Cir.
1973), vacated and remanded, 418 U.S. 918, 918 (1974), reinstated as modified, 510 F.2d
1358, 1359-61 (6th Cir. 1974).
12 Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown 1), 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) ("We conclude that
in the field of public education the doctrine of 'separate but equal' has no place.
Separate educational facilities are inherently unequal.").
13 See Hampton, 72 F. Supp. 2d at 755-56.
14 See id. at 756.
15 See id. at 757.
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Board of Education of Jefferson County and another against the Lou-
isville Board of Education 16 for a failure to eliminate segregation
effectively, as mandated by Brown !/.i1 The plaintiffs sought the deseg-
regation of both public school systems, proposing to merge the Louis-
ville and Jefferson County school districts.' 8 District Judge James
Gordon dismissed both cases, finding that the school districts oper-
ated unitary school systems and had eliminated all vestiges of state-
imposed segregation. 19 Judge Gordon's understanding of a "unitary"
school system was informed by Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of
Education,20 which he interpreted to mean that "'the existence of
some small number of one race or virtually one-race schools within a
district is not in and of itself a mark of a system that still practices
segregation by law.'"'2 1 Judge Gordon decided that only drastic
actions such as cross-town busing would improve integration, a rem-
edy which he perceived to be "totally unrealistic." 22
The Sixth Circuit, however, disagreed with Judge Gordon's rea-
soning and reversed both cases on appeal. 23 The Court stated that the
residual effects of past discrimination had not been stamped out of
the Louisville and Jefferson County school systems and found that
three out of the seventy-four Jefferson County elementary schools con-
tained fifty-six percent of the black student population, and that over
16 The Kentucky State Board of Education ordered the Jefferson County and
Louisville school systems to merge, effective as of April 1, 1975, thereby eliminating
the Louisville Board of Education. See Cunningham v. Grayson, 541 F.2d 538, 539
(6th Cir. 1976).
17 Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown 11), 349 U.S. 294, 299 (1955). In Haycraft v.
Board of Education, No. 7291 (W.D. Ky. Mar. 8, 1973), the plaintiffs alleged that the city
board's attendance zone and transfer system allowed segregation to continue and
caused the creation of racially identifiable schools. Id. slip op. at 4-5. In Newburg
Area Council, Inc. v. Board of Education, No. 7045 (W.D. Ky. Mar. 8, 1973), the plaintiffs
made the same contentions, specifically citing the concentration of black students at
three elementary schools, and blaming the county for purposeful segregation. See id.;
see also Hampton, 72 F. Supp. 2d at 757-58.
18 Hampton, 72 F. Supp. 2d at 757-58. While the district of Anchorage, Kentucky,
was also a proposed defendant, see id., Anchorage was not included in the ultimate
desegregation remedy. The district court judge only considered reassignment plans
for the Louisville Board of Education and the Jefferson County Board of Education in
constructing his remedy. SeeJACK LYNE, SCHOOLHOUSE DREAMS DEFERRED 250 (1998).
19 See Newburg Area Council, Inc. v. Bd. of Educ., 489 F.2d 925, 927 (6th Cir.
1973), vacated and remanded, 418 U.S. 918, 918 (1974), reinstated as modified, 510 F.2d
1358, 1359-61 (6th Cir. 1974).
20 402 U.S. 1 (1971). For a more in-depth discussion of Swann, see infra notes
102-09 and accompanying text.
21 Hampton, 72 F. Supp. 2d at 759-60 (quoting Swann, 402 U.S. at 31).
22 See id.
23 See Newburg Area Council, 489 F.2d at 929, 931.
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eighty percent of Louisville's public schools were racially identifi-
able. 24 "Until the dual system is eliminated 'root and branch,"' the
Court stated, "the school district[s] [have] not conformed to the con-
stitutional standard set forth by Brown nearly 19 years ago. 25
The case was remanded to Judge Gordon in order to formulate a
desegregation plan for the Louisville and Jefferson County school dis-
tricts that would eliminate all vestiges of state-imposed segregation. 26
The school boards petitioned the Sixth Circuit for a stay of its man-
date, which the circuit ultimately denied, after which the school
boards filed a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court in April 1974.27
Meanwhile, a hearing was set for July 1974, in which Judge Gordon,
who had already received numerous death threats because of his
involvement in the desegregation efforts, would require both districts
to submit new assignment plans to him. 28 On July 23, 1974, after
reviewing the proposed plans from the city and county, Judge Gordon
announced his plan for desegregation-"Plan X.'"29 Two days later,
the Supreme Court issued its opinion in Milliken v. Bradley,30 a sepa-
rate but related school desegregation case. It also issued an order
remanding the Louisville and Jefferson County desegregation cases
back to the Sixth Circuit for reconsideration in light of the ruling in
Milliken, an order which Gordon considered to invalidate Plan X
summarily. 31
While Louisville antibusing advocates breathed a sigh of relief at
the judicial postponement of Gordon's policy, this respite was short-
lived. In December 1974, the Sixth Circuit ruled that its original deci-
sion was still valid under Milliken and authorized Judge Gordon to
reorder a desegregation plan.3 2 On July 17, 1975, the Circuit set a
24 See id. at 930.
25 Id. at 928 (quoting Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 438 (1968)).
26 See id. at 932.
27 See Reply Brief at 4, Bd. of Educ. v. Newburg Area Council, Inc., 418 U.S. 918
(1974) (mem.) (No. 73-1430), 1974 WL 186320.
28 See LYNE, supra note 18, at 248.
29 "Plan X" was viewed as a compromise plan between the city-proposed and
county-proposed plans, "Plan A" and "Plan C." Plan X involved the use of a black
student ratio of twelve percent to thirty percent and a method of assignment in which
students would have several years advance notice of the years in which they would be
bused. See id. at 250.
30 418 U.S. 717 (1974). For a more in-depth discussion of Milliken, see infra notes
120-25 and accompanying text.
31 See Newburg Area Council, Inc., 418 U.S. 918; LVNE, supra note 18, at 242.
32 The Sixth Circuit decided that Milliken did not bar an interdistrict remedy
involving both the city and county school districts because both school authorities had
ignored and crossed district lines in the past, resulting in segregation. See Newburg
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due date: Judge Gordon's plan was to take effect that coming fall. 33
Thirteen days later, Gordon announced a plan that was reminiscent of
"Plan X," calling for the realignment of school districts, transfer of
teachers, and cross-town busing.34 The intended result was a system in
which each school maintained no less than twelve percent and no
more than forty percent black enrollment. 35
The new school assignments for black students in grades seven
through eleven were announced on August 21, 1975, a little over
three weeks after Judge Gordon's plan was announced to the city and
less than two weeks before the start of the school year.36 The plan
involved busing based on a method of school "clustering" and student
assignments to "home" schools; each predominantly black school in
the city was clustered with several other predominantly white schools
in the city, and each student was assigned a "home" school based on
geographic proximity to the school. 37 Students would attend either
their home school or a school in their cluster.38
However, the city and county resisted busing until the bitter
end. Throughout the summer and fall of 1975, the Louisville Courier-
Journal was replete with letters and advertisements from various orga-
nizations exhibiting antibusing sentiments. Groups like Concerned
Parents, Inc. and Parents for Freedom hosted speakers who urged par-
ents to keep their children out of schools. 39 The Kentucky Ku Klux
Klan planned five gatherings in the three-week period surrounding
Area Council, Inc. v. Bd. of Educ., 510 F.2d 1358, 1359-61 (6th Cir. 1974). Conse-
quently, the Sixth Circuit reinstated its previous opinion with minor modifications.
See id. at 1361.
33 See Linda Stahl, Jefferson Schools Ask Appeals Judge for Busing Delay, COURIER-J.
(Louisville, Ky.), Aug. 19, 1975, at Al.
34 See Ken Loomis, Grayson Asks Parents to Send Children to School Today, COURIER-J.
(Louisville, Ky.), Sept. 4, 1975, at Al.
35 See Stahl, supra note 33. Additionally, "[u]nder the plan, black students [we] re
to be bused up to 10 of their 12 years in school and white students two of their 12
years." See Timeline: Desegregation in Jefferson County Public Schools, COURIER-JOURNAL.
cOM, Sept. 4, 2005, http://www.courier-journal.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=2005
509040428 [hereinafter Timeline] (describing the nature and stages of the Louisville
area racial assignment plans in public education).
36 See Linda Stahl, School Assignments Set for Blacks in Grades 7-1i, COURIER-J. (Lou-
isville, Ky.), Aug. 22, 1975, at Al.
37 Id.
38 See id.
39 See Antibusing Groups Urge 'Strike, Constitutional Amendment for Halt, COURIER-J.
(Louisville, Ky.),July 11, 1974, at C3; Parents Urged to Keep Children Out of School, Cou-
RIER-J. (Louisville, Ky.), July 11, 1974, at C3.
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the beginning of the school year.40 In mid-August, the Jefferson
County Board of Education and the former Louisville Board of Educa-
tion appealed to the Sixth Circuit for a stay of the busing order. 41 The
court unanimously denied the motion just two days later, as it was said
to "fly in the face" of the Sixth Circuit's July 17 order. 42 An appeal was
subsequently made to the Supreme Court, and on the day before
school was to begin, Justice Blackmun denied the final pending
request for the stay.43 Busing would proceed, with or without the
city's support.
On the eve of the first day of school, the largest antibusing rally of
the summer-drawing an estimated 10,000 to 12,000 people-was
held at Louisville's State Fair and Exposition Center.44 The event
began with a round of wild applause for a man carrying a sign read-
ing, "Hitler relives, Taking our children, Gestapo guards on buses,
Concentration camps."45 That same night, Superintendent Ernest
Grayson made a televised plea for parents not to keep their students
out of school, assuring listeners that the schools were safe and ready
for their children. 46 However, his plea was not well-received. The first
day of school was met with monumentally poor attendance rates,
reaching lows of twenty-one percent at the high school level, nineteen
percent in middle school, and seventeen percent in elementary
school.
4 7
Aside from the low attendance rates, the school day itself seemed
to go off without incident. It was at the close of class that trouble
began. As students were let out for the day, a few schools drew angry
crowds. 48 Protesters shouted racial epithets and made obscene ges-
tures at the black children boarding the buses, with some throwing
stones and pounding on bus doors and windows.49 The abuse was not
40 SeeJim Adams, Concerned Parents Rally Cancelled for Prayer Vigil, COURIER-J. (Lou-
isville, Ky.), Aug. 18, 1975, at Al.
41 See Stahl, supra note 33.
42 Linda Stahl, Appellate Judges Reject Jefferson County's Plea for Delay in Busing Plan,
COURIER-J. (Louisville, Ky.), Aug. 21, 1975, at Al.
43 See Linda Stahl, Blackmun Denies Stay of Busing, COURIER-J. (Louisville, Ky.),
Sept. 4, 1975, at Al.
44 See Busing Foes Hear Plans for Marches, COURIER-J. (Louisville, Ky.), Sept. 4, 1975,
at Al.
45 Id.
46 See Loomis, supra note 34.
47 First-Day Attendance, COURIER-J. (Louisville, Ky.), Sept. 5, 1975, at A5; see An
Area-By-Area Look at the First Day of Busing in Jefferson County, COURIER-J. (Louisville,
Ky.), Sept. 5, 1975, at A3 [hereinafter Area-By-Area Look].
48 See Area-By-Area Look, supra note 47.
49 See id.
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directed towards one race alone; protesters hurled obscenities at
white children and schoolteachers for participating in the busing and
jeered at the "Nazi" policemen. 50 One bus was pelted with egg on its
route, 5' and another parked bus was fired at as it sat in a bus driver's
driveway later that night.52 The worst, however, was still to come. The
city's most violent demonstrations took place during the late after-
noon of September 5 and early on September 6.5 3
At Southern High School, in the south end of Louisville, about
600 people gathered on the evening of Friday, September 5 on the
school grounds, where three buses were set ablaze over the course of
the night and a police helicopter circling overhead was fired upon.
54
Shortly before midnight, the unruly crowd-which had, by this point,
swelled into the street bordering Southern High School-found itself
facing a squad of baton-equipped and gas-mask-clad police officers.
The crowd began to toss cans, bottles, and larger objects such as tire-
rims at the police force, who responded with tear gas canisters.55
At Valley High School, in the southwest end of Louisville, about
2,500 protesters gathered. 56 Over the course of the night, at least
twenty people were injured, including a three-year-old (who was hit by
a brick while riding in a car), an eleven-year-old (who was injured
after the crowd reportedly "turned on" him at the riot) 57 and a thir-
teen-year-old (who was hit in the head with a brick as he watched the
scene from across the street) .58 Additionally, thirty police officers
were injured, and one officer lost an eye after the crowd began using
sling shots to propel fishing sinkers. 59 The officers and their police
cars were also pelted with rocks, bricks, and bottles.60 Tear gas and
riot sticks ultimately had to be used on the crowd and seventy-five
protesters were eventually arrested.61
50 See id.
51 See The Drivers ... One Boycotts, One Gets an Egg on the Windshield, COURIER-J.
(Louisville, Ky.), Sept. 5, 1975, at A7.
52 See Shots Fired into School Bus Parked in Driver's Driveway, COURIER-J. (Louisville,
Ky.), Sept. 5, 1975, at A6.
53 See Clashes at Protests Bring Injuries, Arrests, COUJER-J. (Louisville, Ky.), Sept. 6,
1975, at Al [hereinafter Injuries, Arrests].
54 See id.
55 See id.
56 See id.
57 See id.
58 See Paul Bulleit, Boy, 13, Goes from Watcher to Victim, COURIER-J. & TIMES (Louis-
ville, Ky.), Sept. 7, 1975, at B1.
59 See Injuries, Arrests, supra note 53.
60 See id.
61 See id.
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While early September marked the city's most dramatic response
to busing, it was neither the beginning nor the end of the outcry.
Throughout the late summer and fall of 1975, opinions about busing
filled the editorial pages of the local Courier-Journal, which became
sated with antibusing comments from citizens who believed that
forced busing rode "roughshod" over parents' rights, 62 eroded and
destroyed the citizenry's constitutional heritage, 63 and stripped citi-
zens of their freedom. 64 The University of Louisville Law School stu-
dent newspaper even published an editorial entitled Busing is Cruel
and Unusual Punishment, which endorsed boycotts and peaceful pro-
tests in response to busing.65 The editorial cited a Gallup Poll which
demonstrated the widespread disapproval of the plan, indicating that
97% of whites and 92% of blacks surveyed opposed busing.66 One
incensed Louisvillian began handing out cards containing the num-
ber to the "Hot Line to the White House," and during the first week of
busing the White House comment office received over 4,000 calls
about busing, all but three in opposition and only a handful not con-
cerning Louisville. 67
Despite this outcry, busing remained in full effect in Louisville.
In 1978, three years after his busing order took effect, Judge Gordon
ended active court supervision of the plan, finding that all of Louis-
ville's schools had mostly complied with the racial guidelines, but left
the desegregation decree in place. 68 The student assignment system
underwent several modifications in subsequent decades. Between
1984 and 1996, the school board changed the plan at least three times
to keep schools in compliance with racial guidelines and maximize
educational benefits. 69
62 See, e.g., Everett A. Hayes, Letter to the Editor, COURIER-J. (Louisville, Ky.),
Aug. 23, 1975, at A12.
63 See, e.g., Charles B. Fort, Concerned Parents, Inc., Letter to the Editor, Cou-
RIER-J. (Louisville, Ky.), Aug. 23, 1975, at A12.
64 See Garland D. Haynes, Letter to the Editor, COURIER-J. (Louisville, Ky.), Aug.
23, 1975, at A12.
65 See Keith Runyon, Paper Urges Legal Antibusing Action, COURIER-J. (Louisville,
Ky.), Sept. 11, 1975, at A18.
66 See id.
67 See Charles R. Babcock, Antibusing Calls Flood White House 'Hot-line, 'COURIER-J.
(Louisville, Ky.), Sept. 11, 1975, at C3.
68 See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738,
2807 (2007) (Breyer, J., dissenting); Hampton v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 72 F.
Supp. 2d 753, 765 (W.D. Ky. 1999).
69 In 1984, the middle school and high school plans implemented a zone and
satellite system so that most students were able to attend schools based on where they
lived. See Timeline, supra note 35. The racial guidelines were also changed; elemen-
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In 1998, however, the current student assignment plan came
under attack when six black parents sued the County Board of Educa-
tion to throw out the fifty percent black enrollment cap at Central
High School-a historically black school-arguing that their children
had been unfairly denied admission because of the high school's
required racial composition. 70 After a thorough examination of the
county's history of desegregation, the district court judge, John
Heyburn, ultimately concluded that the racial guidelines at Central
High School were legally permissible because the 1975 desegregation
order issued by Judge Gordon had never actually been dissolved. 71
However, Judge Heyburn spoke of the possibility of judicial dissolu-
tion of the decree after proper motion by the plaintiffs, and in 2000
the parents filed suit to dissolve the 1975 order. 72 The change in the
filing of the suit allowed Heyburn to grant the plaintiffs the relief they
had been denied in their first attempt in court. The Judge stated:
Confronted with the complete disappearance of de jure discrimina-
tion, the impracticability that any further Board policy will apprecia-
bly change our racial demography, vibrant democratic debate about
educational policy, and decades of good faith on the part of the
Board, the Court concludes that Jefferson County Public Schools]
should be free to adopt its student assignment plans without the
dictates of a continuing Decree. 73
Despite its newly-bestowed freedom to formulate a different
assignment plan, in 2001 the Board elected to keep the current policy
in place for all non-magnet schools by a vote of 5-1, requiring a mini-
mum black enrollment of fifteen percent and a maximum black
tary schools required enrollment of 23-43% African American students; middle
schools required 22-42%, and high schools 16-36%. Timeline, supra note 35. In addi-
tion to the redrafting of school zone boundaries, so-called "magnet" schools were
established. See Hampton, 72 F. Supp. 2d at 766. In 1992, Project Renaissance
replaced the system of citywide busing, and was designed to give parents a choice of
schools in the desegregation efforts. Timeline, supra note 35. Racial guidelines were
again changed; elementary schools required 15-50% African American students, mid-
dle schools required 16-46%, and high schools required 12-42%. Timeline, supra
note 35. In 1996, the district changed the plan once more so that all schools required
between 15-50% African American students. See Timeline, supra note 35.
70 See Hampton, 72 F. Supp. 2d at 755, 757 n.5.
71 See id. at 773.
72 See Hampton v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 102 F. Supp. 2d 358, 377 (W.D.
Ky. 2000).
73 Id. Additionally, Heyburn exempted magnet schools from the Board's assign-
ment plan, making Central High School exempt from any racial quotas. See Timeline,
supra note 35.
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enrollment of fifty percent.74 The district kept the racial require-
ments in place at these schools because officials believed that the
twenty-six years of past integration had helped to improve student
achievement in the schools, as demonstrated by higher statewide test
results. 75 Although the school board held public forums before vot-
ing, parents expressed concern at the lack of parental involvement
and input in the decision.76 Not surprisingly, the legal battles were
not over.
This readopted policy came under attack when Joshua McDon-
ald, a white kindergartener in the Louisville public school system, was
prevented from transferring to a school because it would have an
"adverse effect on desegregation compliance" for the school from
which he sought to transfer.77 Joshua was assigned to Young Elemen-
tary, a predominantly black school, and sought to transfer to Bloom
Elementary, which was only a mile from his home. However, under
the Louisville school assignment plan, if a school had reached the
"extremes of the racial guidelines," assignments and transfers were
made or denied in order to improve a school's racial balance. 78
Because Joshua's transfer from Young Elementary to Bloom Elemen-
tary would have forced Young's racial composition to fall outside of
the desired racial guidelines, his transfer was denied. 79
Joshua's mother, Crystal Meredith, brought suit in the Western
District of Kentucky, claiming that the Board of Education's assign-
ment plan violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.80 Both the district court and the Sixth Circuit upheld
the assignment plan as narrowly tailored to serve the Board's compel-
ling interest in diversity.8' The Supreme Court granted certiorari,
ultimately deciding the appeal-together with a similar appeal from
74 See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738,
2749 (2007); Holly Coryell, Board Lifts Quotas at 4 Magnet Schools, COURIER-J. (Louis-
ville, Ky.), Apr. 3, 2001, at Al.
75 See Holly Coryell, Some Target School Racial Quotas, COURIER-J. (Louisville, Ky.),
Mar. 16, 2001, at BI.
76 See Coryell, supra note 74.
77 Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2749-50 (internal quotation marks omitted).
78 See id.
79 See Chris Kenning, Racial Guideline Suit May Add Voice, COURIER-J. (Louisville,
Ky.), Apr. 16, 2003, at Al; Chris Kenning, School Desegregation Plan on Trial, COURIER-J.
(Louisville, Ky.), Dec. 8, 2003, at Al.
80 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
81 See McFarland v. Jefferson County Pub. Sch., 330 F. Supp. 2d 834,
861-62 (W.D. Ky. 2004), affd, 416 F.3d 513, 514 (6th Cir. 2005), rev'd, Parents Involved,
127 S. Ct. 2738.
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the Ninth Circuit-in Parents Involved.82 The stage was set for the
Court's first decision on race-based assignment plans in integrated
elementary and secondary schools.
In a 5-4 vote, the Court ultimately struck down the assignment
policies as unconstitutional, ushering in a new era for the use of race
in public education. The decision affected not only Louisville and
Seattle, but school districts around the country that had administered
similar assignment programs that operated under the assumption that
such plans were constitutional. Those assumptions were based on the
school districts' various interpretations of Supreme Court cases
addressing the issue of race use in education, beginning with Brown
and ending with Grutter v. Bollinge8 3 and its companion case, Gratz v.
Bollinger.84
II. COURT-ORDERED DESEGREGATION: BROWN AND ITS PROGENY
The Roberts Court decided Parents Involved against a backdrop of
previous Supreme Court cases addressing race and public education.
However, because the Court never fully addressed the precise issue of
voluntary integration efforts in K-12 education before Parents
Involved, an examination of the judicial history of the use of race in
school assignments is instructive in illuminating the precedent set in
place at the time Parents Involved was decided. "l[T] he historical and
factual context in which [Parents Involved] ar[ose] is critical."8 5
A. Implementing Desegregation: Brown I, Brown II,
Green, and Swann
1. Brown I
A thorough examination of the desegregation cases must begin
with Brown, which invalidated the holding of Plessy v. Fergusons 6 and
laid the foundation for a long line of cases clarifying how, and under
what circumstances, desegregation remedies may be implemented.
Brown Iwas a consolidation of four Equal Protection suits filed by par-
ents of black children who had been denied admission to white
82 Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2749.
83 530 U.S. 306 (2003). For a more in-depth discussion of Grutter, see infra notes
162-70 and accompanying text.
84 539 U.S. 244 (2003). For a more in-depth discussion of Gratz, see infra notes
171-74 and accompanying text.
85 Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2801 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
86 163 U.S. 537, 550-52 (1896) (holding that a state statute requiring separate
accommodations for whites and blacks in railroad compartments was constitutional),
overruled by Brown v. Bd. Of Educ (Brown 1), 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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schools due to various state laws permitting segregation. 87 The Court
held in Brown I that "in the field of public education, the doctrine of
,separate but equal' has no place. Separate educational facilities are
inherently unequal."88 Consequently, in holding that dejure segrega-
tion denied black children the equal protection of the laws guaran-
teed under the Fourteenth Amendment, Brown I effectively ended the
fifty-eight-year judicial endorsement of segregation in public schools.
2. Brown II
Brown I reserved the issue of how to successfully integrate public
school systems for Brown IH89 In this second installment of Brown, the
Court charged the school boards of segregated school districts with
several specific tasks to remedy segregation: assessing and solving local
school problems, attempting a good-faith implementation of gov-
erning constitutional principles, and determining student admission
to schools on a nonracial basis.90 Notably, Brown II called for the
implementation of integration "with all deliberate speed." 9'
3. Green
After over a decade of massive resistance to desegregation, the
Supreme Court in Green v. County School Board92 effectively ordered
schools districts to end segregation immediately.93 New Kent County,
a rural county in Eastern Virginia, operated two schools on different
sides of the county.9 4 The two schools were segregated until 1965,
when the county adopted a "freedom-of-choice" plan to comply with
87 Brown I, 347 U.S. at 486 n.1, 487.
88 Id. at 495.
89 Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown I1), 349 U.S. 294 (1955); Brown I, 347 U.S. at
495-96.
90 Brown II, 349 U.S. at 299.
91 Id. at 301. The Brown cases have been characterized by some as 'judicial abdi-
cation," in which the Court left the ultimate remedy to be decided by lower courts.
See, e.g., Darren Lenard Hutchinson, "Unexplainable on Grounds Other Than Race": The
Inversion of Privilege and Subordination in Equal Protection Jurisprudence, 2003 U. ILL. L.
REV. 615, 632 (stating that institutional concerns and racial politics led to such abdica-
tion); G. Edward White, ChiefJustice Marshall, Justice Holmes, and the Discourse of Consti-
tutional Adjudication, 30 WM. & MARY L. REV. 131, 140-41 (1988) (explaining that the
problem in Brown I that invited such abdication was not the difficulty of enforcement,
but the difficulty in justifying Court intervention in light of southern preferences and
the lack of congressional action).
92 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
93 Id. at 439-40.
94 Id. at 432.
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desegregation requirements under the Brown decisions. 95 After oper-
ating for three years under the "freedom-of-choice" plan, however,
not a single white child had chosen to attend the former black school,
and eighty-five percent of the black students still remained in the all-
black school. 96
The Supreme Court found that this plan was simply not sufficient
to fulfill Brown II's mandate. Allowing black children the option to
attend former white schools was only the first step to desegregation.9 7
The ultimate goal was the operation of a unitary, nonracial school
system. 98 Accordingly, the burden on the New Kent County School
Board was to come forward with a plan that would "promise[] realisti-
cally to work, and promise[] realistically to work now."99 Significantly,
the Court did not hold that a freedom-of-choice plan was unconstitu-
tional in and of itself, but only that a freedom-of-choice plan "is not an
end in itself' if there are more effective ways of conversion to an inte-
grated, unitary school system. 100
Green represented a fundamental change in the jurisprudence of
the Supreme Court. Prior to the decision, the Court seemed to
"limit[] the scope of the Brown opinions to non-discriminatory stu-
dent assignment policies, not compulsory integration." 10 1 After Green,
however, active integration became obligatory, and was to be accom-
plished with Brown II's required "deliberate speed."' 0 2 Significantly,
Green's focus was directed at the powers and responsibilities of school
boards and the obligations that arose as a result of the need for educa-
tional integration, not the power of the district courts to remedy
segregation.
4. Swann
Courts' remedial powers to achieve integration at the necessary
speed were greatly broadened in Swann. In Swann, the petitioner
claimed that the city of Charlotte's attempts at educational integra-
tion-an assignment plan based on geographic zoning with a free
transfer provision-fell short of the active and immediate integration
95 See id. at 433.
96 Id. at 441.
97 Id. at 436.
98 See id.
99 Id. at 439.
100 Id. at 440.
101 KEVIN BROWN, RACE, LAW AND EDUCATION IN THE POsT-DESEGREGATION ERA 176
(2005).
102 Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown 11), 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955).
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demanded in Green.10 3 The district court of North Carolina agreed; as
of June 1969, two-thirds of the black students in Charlotte attended
twenty-one schools which were either all-black or ninety-nine percent
black.104 To remedy the existence of the dual school system, the dis-
trict court imposed a student assignment plan that included possible
rezoning and the busing of students. 0 5
The Supreme Court unanimously upheld the district court's bus-
ing order.106 The Court stated that "the scope of a district court's
equitable powers to remedy past wrongs is broad, for breadth and flex-
ibility are inherent in equitable remedies. ' 10 7 Accordingly, while
[n]o rigid guidelines as to student transportation can be given for
application to the infinite variety of problems presented in
thousands of situations....
[i]n the[] circumstances [of the case], we find no basis for holding
that the local school authorities may not be required to employ bus
transportation as one tool of school desegregation. Desegregation
plans cannot be limited to the walk-in school.108
The Swann Court recognized that "[t] he remedy for such segregation
may be administratively awkward, inconvenient, and even bizarre in
some situations and may impose burdens on some; but all awkward-
ness and inconvenience cannot be avoided in the interim period
when remedial adjustments are being made to eliminate the dual
school systems."' 0 9
The progressive steps endorsed by the Supreme Court in Green
and Swann, coupled with the Civil Rights Act of 1964,110 helped accel-
erate desegregation efforts in public schools and created a "dramatic
and immediate" result."1 Between 1968 and 1972, the percentage of
black students attending predominantly-white schools nationwide
103 Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 7 (1971).
104 See id.
105 See Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 311 F. Supp. 265, 269
(W.D.N.C. 1970), vacated, 431 F.2d 138 (4th Cir. 1970), affd in part, 402 U.S. 1.
106 See Swann, 402 U.S. at 30, 32.
107 Id. at 15.
108 Id. at 29-30.
109 Id. at 28.
110 Title VI of the Civil Rights Act prohibits discrimination in federally assisted
programs, providing that "[n]o person in the United States shall, on the ground of
race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the bene-
fits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Fed-
eral financial assistance." Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 601, 78 Stat.
241, 252 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2000)).
111 BROWN, supra note 101, at 177.
2188 [VOL. 83:5
FULFILLING THE PROMISE OF BROWN?
increased from 23.4% to 36.4%.112 In that same time period, the
number of black students in schools enrolling 90% or more minority
students had decreased from 64.3% to 38.7%.113
B. Limiting Desegregation Remedies: Keyes and Milliken
1. Keyes
However readily the Supreme Court appeared to grant district
courts and school districts broad powers to achieve immediate and
complete integration, later decisions made clear that those powers
were not limitless. Keyes v. School District No. 1114 marked the first time
the Supreme Court addressed the issue of desegregation in a district
that had never statutorily imposed segregation on its students. 115 On
certiorari, the Supreme Court, without actually deciding whetherjudi-
cial desegregation was a proper remedy for the Denver school district,
drew a crucial distinction between de jure and de facto segregation
and the availability of a judicial remedy in both instances. The Court
stated that "the differentiating factor between dejure segregation and
so-called de facto segregation ... is purpose or intent to segregate."1 16
De jure segregation is, "stated simply, a current condition of segrega-
tion resulting from intentional state action directed specifically to the
[segregated] schools." 1 7 The lynchpin for the Court in identifying
unconstitutional segregation that justified judicial intervention was
intent. While de facto segregation alone, without an intent to segre-
gate, is not a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, policies that
appear to be racially-neutral and result in de facto segregation will
violate the Fourteenth Amendment if an intent to segregate is
found.11 8 Keyes was significant because it recognized an important
112 Id.
113 Id.
114 413 U.S. 189 (1973).
115 The case involved the Denver, Colorado, school district, which had never man-
dated segregation in public education by law. See id. at 191. However, parents and
students filing suit claimed that the school district was nevertheless to blame for the
current segregation in its public schools. The lack of legal segregation was immate-
rial. See id. They argued that the school district, by using certain techniques such as
manipulating the school attendance zones and selecting school sites while using a
neighborhood school policy, had purposefully aimed to create racially segregated
schools throughout the district. Accordingly, the petitioners sought ajudicial decree
ordering the desegregation of the entire school district. See id.
116 Id. at 208.
117 Id. at 205-06.
118 The Court stated that the respondent school board had deliberately aimed at
racial segregation in schools that over one-third of the black population attended,
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boundary of judicial and administrative desegregation remedies. It
clarified the scope of judicial remedies, limiting intervention to
instances of de jure segregation, and not instances of de facto
desegregation.119
2. Milliken
Milliken further restricted courts' power to compel integration. 120
In Milliken, the Detroit National Association for the Advancement for
Colored People (NAACP) brought suit, along with parents and stu-
dents, against the city of Detroit for intentional segregation in viola-
tion of the Equal Protection Clause. I2' The district court found that
Detroit had, in fact, manipulated its school assignment policies to
maintain a segregated school system.1 22 The district court ordered
the state to prepare a busing remedy that included suburban Detroit
areas where constitutional violations had occurred.12 3
The Supreme Court reversed the decision, concluding that
absent an interdistrict violation-a violation "where the racially dis-
criminatory acts of one or more school districts caused racial segrega-
tion in an adjacent district, or where district lines [had] been
deliberately drawn on the basis of race"-there can be no interdistrict
remedy. 124 In this sense, Milliken dealt a "dramatic blow" to the pro-
gressive expansion of desegregation remedies, inhibiting districts
from crossing an offending city's boundary into the adjoining suburbs
and thus contributing to "white flight" from urban to suburban
districts. 25
C. Dissolving Desegregation Decrees: Dowell and Freeman
1. Dowell
Many of the desegregation orders issued in the 1970s resulted in
Brown II's desired integration. The question remained of what a
school district could do once its school board had earnestly complied
which "establishes a prima facie case of intentional segregation in the core city
schools" and therefore "[the School Board's] neighborhood school policy is not to be
determinative 'simply because it appears to be neutral."' Id. at 213 (quoting Swann v.
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 28 (1971)).
119 See id. at 211.
120 See Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 745 (1974).
121 See id. at 722-23.
122 See id. at 725.
123 See id.
124 Id. at 745.
125 BROWN, supra note 101, at 211.
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with a court order and eliminated de jure segregation in its school
system. The Supreme Court answered this question in Board of Educa-
tion v. Dowell.126 The decision in Dowell marked the culmination of
several decades of litigation centering on a desegregation order that
had been issued by a federal district court in 1972. The decree
authorized the busing of students and allowed elementary students to
attend neighborhood schools. 127 After examining the Oklahoma City
School District's long history of implementing the desegregation plan,
the Supreme Court held that when a school board has made a suffi-
cient showing of constitutional compliance with a desegregation order
and has eliminated the vestiges of past discrimination to the extent
practicable, the order can be judicially dissolved. According to the
Court, desegregation decrees are not meant to "operate in
perpetuity."'128
2. Freeman
A school district does not have to be in compliance with every
aspect of a desegregation decree in order to receive a judicial dissolu-
tion of that decree; partial dissolution may be granted in cases where
partial compliance is demonstrated. In Freeman v. Pitts,129 the Court
held that a decree-issuing court can withdraw its supervision over parts
of the order in which a school district has achieved compliance and in
"incremental stages, before full compliance has been achieved in
126 498 U.S. 237 (1991).
127 See Dowell v. Bd. of Educ., 338 F. Supp. 1256, 1273 (W.D. Okla. 1972), affJd,
465 F.2d 1012 (10th Cir. 1972). After the Board had complied with the 1972 order
for five years, they filed a "Motion to Close Case." Dowell, 498 U.S. at 240. The district
court consequently terminated its jurisdiction over the desegregation of the school
district and issued an "Order Terminating Case," stating that the school board had
complied with the decree. Id. at 240-41. In 1985, the respondents of Dowell moved
to reopen the case on the grounds that the school system had returned to a state of
segregation and was no longer unitary. See id. at 242. The district court ultimately
found that the present segregation in the city was the result of "imbalance in residen-
tial patterns," "economic pressures," and "voluntary preferences" and therefore not a
remnant of dejure segregation warranting a re-opening of the case. See Dowell v. Bd.
of Educ., 677 F. Supp. 1503, 1521 (W.D. Okla. 1987). The court of appeals reversed,
however, holding that, despite the unitary finding, the Board had the "'affirmative
duty ... not to take any action that would impede the process of disestablishing the
dual system and its effects.'" Dowell v. Bd. of Educ., 890 F.2d 1483, 1504 (10th Cir.
1989) (quoting Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 443 U.S. 526, 538 (1979)).
128 See Dowell, 498 U.S. at 248-50. The Court remanded the case to the district
court for further factfinding to determine if the decree could be dissolved due to the
school's compliance. See id. at 248.
129 503 U.S. 467 (1992).
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every area of school operations." 30  Specifically, the district court
found that the DeKalb County School System (DCSS) had complied
with the desegregation order in terms of its student assignments,
transportation policy, physical facilities, and extracurricular activi-
ties, 131 but had not fulfilled the decree in terms of its teacher and
principal assignments, resource allocation, and quality of educa-
tion. 13 2 Accordingly, a partial dissolution was appropriate.1 33
D. A Note on Requirement and Permissibility
Much has been said of district courts' broad remedial powers
upon a finding of intentional or de jure segregation and the lack of
power absent such constitutional violations. 134 However, there is a
notable absence of precedent concerning the permissibility of volun-
tary measures taken by K-12 school districts to remedy segregation.
Several cases have been cited-most notably by Justice Breyer in his
Parents Involved dissent-as establishing the proposition that schools
may voluntarily and constitutionally undertake measures to remedy
desegregation without the need for a court order. 135
130 Id. at 490.
131 See id. at 474.
132 See id.
133 See id. Additionally, the district court found that while the school district had
experienced a level of resegregation in recent years, this was due to demographic
changes and not any intentional segregation on the part of the school board. Conse-
quently, the racial imbalance in certain schools "was not a vestige of the prior dejure
system." Id. at 478. "[The actions of DCSS] achieved maximum practical desegrega-
tion from 1969 to 1986. The rapid population shifts in DeKalb County were not
caused by any action on the part of the DCSS. These demographic shifts were inevita-
ble as the result of suburbanization ...." Id. at 480 (alteration in original) (internal
quotation marks omitted). Freeman, coupled with Dowell, serves to establish certain
boundaries of desegregation decrees; such decrees must be limited in scope and dura-
tion and cannot be used to prevent resegregation that has resulted from private hous-
ing choices not attributable to state action.
134 See, e.g., Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 211 (1973).
135 Justice Breyer stated in his dissent in Parents Involved:
The opinions cited by the plurality to justify its reliance upon the dejure/de
facto distinction only address what remedial measures a school district may
be constitutionally required to undertake. As to what is permitted, nothing in
our equal protection law suggests that a State may right only those wrongs
that it committed. No case of this Court has ever relied upon the dejure/de
facto distinction in order to limit what a school district is voluntarily allowed
to do. That is what is at issue here. And Swann, McDaniel, Crawford, North
Carolina Bd. of Ed., Harris, and Bustop made one thing clear: significant as the
difference between dejure and defacto segregation may be to the question of
what a school district must do, that distinction is not germane to the ques-
tion of what a school district may do.
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Dicta in those decisions has been construed as allowing school
districts to take broad measures to remedy segregation, even without a
judicial desegregation decree. In Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg, the
Court stated:
School authorities are traditionally charged with broad power to
formulate and implement educational policy and might well con-
clude, for example, that in order to prepare students to live in a
pluralistic society each school should have a prescribed ratio of
Negro to white students reflecting the proportion for the district as
a whole. To do this as an educational policy is within the broad
discretionary powers of school authorities .... 136
Additionally, in North Carolina State Board of Education v. Swann, 13 7
Justice Burger, speaking for the Court, seemed to verify that proposi-
tion by stating that "school authorities have wide discretion in formu-
lating school policy, and that as a matter of educational policy school
authorities may well conclude that some kind of racial balance in the
schools is desirable quite apart from any constitutional
requirements."138
While the line between what school districts may do and what
school districts must do in terms of integration is somewhat blurry in
light of these precedents, any doubt pertaining to school districts'
powers of voluntary integration was laid to rest in Parents Involved,
which clarified what school districts cannot do. While the Court in
prior dicta had suggested that voluntary integration plans were consti-
tutional,1 3 9 Parents Involved explicitly limited the ability of school dis-
Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738, 2823-24
(2007) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
136 Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 16 (1971).
137 402 U.S. 43 (1971).
138 Id. at 45.
139 In McDaniel v. Barresi, 402 U.S. 39 (1971), the Supreme Court upheld an inte-
gration plan (which required twenty to forty percent black students in schools) that
was adopted without a court order, stating that "[t] he Clarke County Board of Educa-
tion, as part of its affirmative duty to disestablish the dual school system, properly took
into account the race of its elementary school children in drawing attendance lines."
Id. at 41. In Board of Education v. Harris, 444 U.S. 130 (1979), the Supreme Court
recognized that a school district may be required to integrate its faculty pursuant to
the Federal Emergency School Aid Act even when segregation is de facto and thus
not a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 148-49. In Crawford v. Board of
Education, 458 U.S. 527 (1982), the Supreme Court similarly acknowledged that a
state constitution may impose a greater duty on school districts to desegregate than
does the United States Constitution, requiring integration efforts even in the absence
of intentional de jure segregation. Id. at 535-36. Such state constitution require-
ments were challenged in Bustop, Inc. v. Board of Education, 439 U.S. 1380 (1978),
where the Court upheld a California desegregation plan issued under the authority of
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tricts to use race-based assignment measures to remedy situations
involving past de jure segregation or a court-ordered desegregation
decree.
E. Affirmative Action in Higher Education Admissions Policies:
Bakke, Grutter, and Gratz
1. Bakke
The Court turned its attention to the use of race in university
admissions in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke.140 Bakke
concerned a university's voluntary efforts to integrate without any
finding of prior discrimination, a question which had not yet crossed
the Supreme Court's docket. Allan Bakke, a white male, applied to
the Medical School of the University of California at Davis in 1973 and
1974.141 He was denied admission both years and subsequently filed
suit against the University, claiming that the Medical School denied
him admission based on his race, in violation of the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and section 601 of Title VI of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964.142 Specifically, Bakke cited the Univer-
sity's "special admissions program"-which reserved a specific num-
ber of spots in the class for students who were economically or
educationally disadvantaged or members of minority groups 143-as
the cause for his unconstitutional rejection. 144
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to address the important
constitutional issue, eventually producing a myriad of opinions in the
decision-six in total-none of which definitively resolved the Four-
teenth Amendment question. Instead, the Court only held that the
University's special admissions program violated Title VI of the Civil
the California Constitution, stating throughJustice Rehnquist: "While I have the grav-
est doubts that the Supreme Court of California was required by the United States
Constitution to take the action that it has taken in this case, I have very little doubt
that it was permitted by that Constitution to take such action." Id. at 1383.
140 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
141 See id. at 276 (opinion of Powell, J.).
142 See id. at 277-78.
143 Id. at 274-75. The Medical School apparently viewed these groups as "Blacks,"
"Chicanos," "Asians," and "American Indians." Id.
144 The applicants in the special admissions pool were rated by a separate commit-
tee, which was comprised primarily of minority members. See id. at 274. The special
admissions candidates did not have to meet the minimum C.P.A. cutoff of 2.5
required for regularly admitted students and filled sixteen out of the one hundred
spots in the class. See id. at 275. The Supreme Court of California found that the
University's program violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment and ordered Bakke's admission to the Medical School. See id. at 280-81.
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Rights Act of 1964, thereby affirming the lower court's order to grant
Bakke admission to the Medical School. 145 While the Court's holding
dodged the constitutional issue, several separate opinions spoke to
Bakke's constitutional claim. Notably, Justice Powell's opinion, the
narrowest supporting the outcome, became extremely important for
future decisions concerning the constitutionality of the use of race in
public education admissions programs. Justice Powell viewed the Uni-
versity's program as a racial and ethnic classification system. Regard-
less of whether the admission of sixteen "specially admitted" students
was viewed as a quota or a goal, Powell concluded that this was never-
theless a "line drawn on the basis of race and ethnic status," making
the classification inherently suspect and subject to strict scrutiny. 46
To address the University's contention that its racial classification
served a beneficial purpose, Powell spoke briefly to the relevance of
motives in a strict scrutiny analysis. 147 First, he stated that a benign
145 See id. at 320; see also id. at 421 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). Justice Stevens' opinion was joined by ChiefJustice Burger and Justices Stewart
and Rehnquist. The Supreme Court also reversed the decision of the California court
enjoining the University from any consideration of an applicant's race in future
admissions, because, according to justice Powell, a state "has a substantial interest that
legitimately may be served by a properly devised admissions program involving the
competitive consideration of race and ethnic origin." Id. at 320 (opinion of Powell,
J.). This part of the decision, Part V-C, was joined by Justices Brennan, White, Mar-
shall, and Blackmun.
146 See id. at 289-92. In deciding what level of scrutiny to apply, Powell cited Hira-
bayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943) ("Distinctions between citizens solely
because of their ancestry are by their very nature odious to a free people whose insti-
tutions are founded upon the doctrine of equality."), and Korematsu v. United States,
323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) ("[AII legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a
single racial group are immediately suspect. That is not to say that all such restric-
tions are unconstitutional. It is to say that courts must subject them to the most rigid
scrutiny."). For additional discussion, see Bakke, 438 U.S. at 290-91 (opinion of Pow-
ell, J.).
147 Justice Powell particularly aimed his discussion of benign motives at coun-
tering the arguments ofJustice Brennan, who took the analysis of the program out of
a strict scrutiny context altogether, believing that the program could be justified
merely by its aim to benefit, as opposed to stigmatize, a particular racial group. See
Bakke, 438 U.S. at 359 (Brennan,J., concurring in thejudgment in part and dissenting
in part) ("[We] conclude that racial classifications designed to further remedial pur-
poses 'must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially
related to achievement of those objectives.'" (quoting Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S.
313, 317 (1977))); see also id. at 373-74 ("The second prong of our test-whether the
Davis program stigmatizes any discrete group or individual and whether race is rea-
sonably used in light of the program's objectives-is clearly satisfied by the Davis pro-
gram."). Justice Powell responded that "it is inappropriate to inquire only whether
there is any conceivable basis that might sustain such a classification. Instead, to jus-
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purpose is not always clear in a racially-based program. 148 Second,
according to Powell, preferences that help one group may also cause
harm by reinforcing a stereotype that the group is unable to achieve
success without the aid of the program. 149 Finally, Powell explained
that there is an inherent unfairness in asking an innocent person to
suffer the burden of redressing an inequality that was not of his or her
making.15 0 Therefore, a "benign" motive is no defense to the use of
racial classifications.
Justice Powell then moved on to a strict scrutiny analysis of the
University's use of race in admissions, setting out the two basic steps
required in any such constitutional analysis: first, the state must iden-
tify a legitimate compelling interest, and second, the race-based pro-
gram must be narrowly tailored to serve that interest.151 Powell
examined several possible interests that could be asserted by the Uni-
versity. First, he found that pure racial balancing is "discrimination
for its own sake" and never constitutionally permissible. 152 Second, he
stated that the University did have a legitimate and substantial interest
in ameliorating the effects of identified discrimination; however, this
required a finding of a constitutional or statutory violation causing
harm to a racially identified group. In the event of such identified
harm, the remedy had to be tailored to vindicate the specific rights
that were violated.' 53 The University made no such finding, and Jus-
tice Powell asserted that remedying "societal discrimination" alone,
without a finding of a concrete statutory or constitutional violation,
does not justify imposing burdens on students who bear no responsi-
bility for the harm inflicted on the minority group.' 54
Finally, Powell examined the University's interest in diversity in
its student body. He concluded that in the context of higher educa-
tion, diversity is a constitutionally permissible goal, as academic free-
dom has been a long-held concern for universities under the First
Amendment. 155 Powell clarified, however, that the type of diversity
tify such a classification an important and articulated purpose for its use must be
shown." Id. at 361 (opinion of Powell, J.).
148 See id. at 298 (opinion of Powell, J.).
149 See id.
150 See id.
151 See id. at 305.
152 Id. at 307.
153 See id. at 307-08.
154 See id. at 310. The third goal asserted by the University, not addressed here
because of its unique applicability to medical schools, was promoting health care ser-
vices to underserved communities; Powell found no evidence that the program was
tailored to this goal. See id.
155 See id. at 311-12.
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that furthers a compelling state interest "encompasses a far broader
array of qualifications and characteristics of which racial or ethnic ori-
gin is but a single though important element."156 A university must
therefore show that its program is narrowly tailored to promote that
kind of wide-ranging diversity. 157
The University's program failed to show such narrow tailoring.
Powell found that the University's special admissions program focused
solely on ethnic diversity, operating as a racial classification system
which actually hindered the attainment of legitimate diversity-diver-
sity based on a broader array of qualifications than race alone. 5 8
Because the Medical School failed to show how its program was neces-
sary to promote a compelling interest, Powell believed that the pro-
gram was unconstitutional. He concluded:
In summary, it is evident that the Davis special admissions pro-
gram involves the use of an explicit racial classification never before
countenanced by this Court. It tells applicants who are not Negro,
Asian, or Chicano that they are totally excluded from a specific per-
centage of the seats in an entering class .... [T]hey are never
afforded the chance to compete with applicants from the preferred
groups for the special admissions seats. . . . [However,] the pre-
ferred applicants have the opportunity to compete for every seat in
the class.
The fatal flaw in petitioner's preferential program is its disre-
gard of individual rights as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. Such rights are not absolute. But when a State's distribution
of benefits or imposition of burdens hinges on ancestry or the color
of a person's skin, that individual is entitled to a demonstration that
the challenged classification is necessary to promote a substantial
state interest. [The University] has failed to carry this burden. 159
Bakke has been thought to represent a prohibition on quotas in
educational affirmative action policies. 160 However, because Justice
Powell wrote only for himself, Bakke left open the constitutional ques-
tion of whether diversity can be asserted by a state as a compelling
government interest. This question was not definitively answered by
the Supreme Court for another twenty-five years, when a pair of cases
concerning the University of Michigan's undergraduate and law
156 Id. at 315.
157 See id. at 314-15.
158 See id. at 315.
159 Id. at 319-20 (citation omitted).
160 See, e.g., Suhrid S. Gajendragadkar, The Constitutionality of Racial Balancing in
Charter Schools, 106 COLUM. L. REv. 144, 174 n.207 (2006); Daniel N. Lipson, Embracing
Diversity: The Institutionalization of Affirmative Action as Diversity Management at UC-Berke-
ley, LIT-Austin, and UW-Madison, 32 LAw & Soc. INQUIRY 985, 1010-11 (2007).
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school admissions policies- Gratz and Grutter-once again placed the
constitutionality of race-based programs in higher education at the
forefront ofjudicial discussion. The cases once and for all established
the proposition that diversity in an educational setting is a compelling
interest. 161
2. Grutter
Grutter concerned the University of Michigan Law School's admis-
sion policy. The Law School sought to achieve a diverse student popu-
lation, enrolling a "critical mass" 162 of underrepresented minority
students to "ensur[e] their ability to make unique contributions to the
character of the Law School.' 63 In order to determine whether the
Law School asserted a constitutionally legitimate interest to justify its
use of race, the Court looked to Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke.
Chief Justice Rehnquist, speaking for the Court, enumerated those
interests which Powell rejected, and ultimately accepted the one inter-
est that was approved by Powell as a legitimate goal for a university:
"'the attainment of a diverse student body." 1 64
While the Court held that the Law School had asserted a compel-
ling interest in attaining a diverse student body, the Court also
required that the program be narrowly tailored to achieve that inter-
est. 165 To be narrowly tailored, race-conscious systems cannot employ
quotas, insulating "'each category of applicants with certain desired
161 See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 322 (2003) ("We granted certiorari to
resolve the disagreement among the Courts of Appeals on a question of national
importance: Whether diversity is a compelling interest that can justify the narrowly
tailored use of race in selecting applicants for admission to public universities." (cita-
tion omitted)); id. at 328 ("Today, we hold that the Law School has a compelling
interest in attaining a diverse student body.").
162 See id. at 316. The then-Dean of the Law School, Jeffrey Lehman, also "indi-
cated that critical mass means numbers such that underrepresented minority students
do not feel isolated or like spokespersons for their race." Id. at 318-19.
163 Id. at 316 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). The
policy did not define diversity solely in terms of racial and ethnic status, but did
reaffirm the Law School's longstanding commitment to one particular type
of diversity, that is, racial and ethnic diversity with special reference to the
inclusion of students from groups which have been historically discriminated
against, like African-Americans, Hispanics and Native Americans, who with-
out this commitment might not be represented in our student body in
meaningful numbers.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
164 Id. at 324 (quoting Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 311
(1978) (opinion of Powell, J.)).
165 Id. at 333.
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qualifications from competition with all other applicants."' 1 66 The
Court found that the Law School's plan was narrowly tailored, as it
allowed for individualized consideration of its applicants. 167 The Law
School did not make race or ethnicity a predominant factor in an
applicant's admissions; rather, it weighed such variables equally
against other considerations. 168 Moreover, the Law School was
required to consider alternatives in good faith, but did not have to
implement policies that would sacrifice the diversity of students or the
academic quality of the students. 169 Grutter marked a shift from the
importance of "necessity" to "individualized consideration" in the
Court's narrow tailoring analysis. 170 Indeed, the presence of this
"individual consideration" distinguishes Grutter from Gratz.
3. Gratz
Gratz concerned the admissions policy of the undergraduate pro-
gram at the University of Michigan. The admissions process involved
the use of a 150-point "selection index," in which applicants were
automatically granted twenty points if they were members of under-
represented racial or ethnic minority groups. 17i After an examination
of the program's use of racial classifications under a strict scrutiny
analysis, the Supreme Court found that while the school asserted a
compelling interest in educational diversity, 172 its use of race was not
narrowly tailored to achieve the asserted compelling interest because
the program automatically distributed twenty points-twenty percent
166 Id. at 334 (quoting Bakke, 438 U.S. at 315 (opinion of Powell, J.)).
Quotas "impose a fixed number or percentage which must be attained, or
which cannot be exceeded," and "insulate the individual from comparison
with all other candidates for the available seats." In contrast, "a permissible
goal . . . require[s] only a good-faith effort . . . to come within a range
demarcated by the goal itself," and permits consideration of race as a "plus"
factor in any given case while still ensuring that each candidate "compete [s]
with all other qualified applicants."
Id. at 335 (alterations in original) (citations omitted). The Court stated that "[t]he
Law School's goal of attaining a critical mass of underrepresented minority students
does not transform its program into a quota." Id. at 335-36.
167 See id. at 334-37.
168 See id. at 333-37.
169 See id. at 339-40.
170 See Ian Ayres & Sydney Foster, Don't Tell, Don't Ask: Narrow Tailoring After Grut-
ter and Gratz, 85 TEX. L. REv. 517, 523, 541 (2007).
171 Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 254-55 (2003).
172 See id. at 268.
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of the points needed for admission-to every underrepresented
minority based solely on his or her race.17 3
Again relying on Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke, the Court
stated that a narrowly tailored plan should not "contemplate that any
single characteristic automatically ensure [s] a specific and identifiable
contribution to a university's diversity," but that each characteristic of
an applicant should be considered for admission. 174 The Court did
not find such individualized consideration in the undergraduate col-
lege admissions policy because the twenty-point allocation for minori-
ties made racial or ethnic status virtually dispositive in the admissions
process. Therefore, the University's undergraduate admissions pro-
gram violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
4. The Impact of Gratz and Grutter
Before Grutter, many circuit courts assumed, without holding,
that diversity in public schools was a compelling interest.175 Grutter
and Gratz augmented the line of cases involving the use of race in
education by clarifying the permissibility of asserting a compelling
interest in diversity in the higher education context: a school that had
no history of racial segregation could nevertheless take race into
account to foster a compelling interest in diversity. After Grutter,
these assumptions were confirmed by actual holdings, and many cir-
cuit courts relied on Grutter in asserting that diversity was a compelling
interest in K-12 education.1 76 The extent to which this assumption
was correct was clarified in the long-awaited opinion of Parents
Involved, which examined the use of race-based admissions in public
elementary and secondary schools. 177 The Court in Parents Involved
used much of the language of Gratz and Grutter for analytical support,
173 Id. at 270.
174 Id. at 271.
175 See LisaJ. Holmes, Comment, After Grutter: Ensuring Diversity in K-12 Schools,
52 UCLA L. REV. 563, 574-75 (2004). Cases include Eisenberg v. Montgomery County
Public School, 197 F.3d 123, 130 (4th Cir. 1999); Tuttle v. Arlington County School Board,
195 F.3d 698, 705 (4th Cir. 1999); and Wessman v. Gittens, 160 F.3d 790, 796 (1st Cir.
1998). See Holmes, supra, at 575-79.
176 See, e.g., Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 426 F.3d
1162, 1177 (9th Cir. 2005), rev'd, 127 S. Ct. 2736 (2007); McFarland v. Jefferson
County Pub. Sch., 416 F.3d 513, 514 (6th Cir. 2005), rev'd, Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct.
2738; Comfort v. Lynn Sch. Comm., 418 F.3d 1, 16 (1st Cir. 2005), abrogated by Parents
Involved, 127 S. Ct. 2738.
177 The cases on appeal were McFarland v. Jefferson County Public Schools, 416 F.3d
513, and Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District, No. 1, 426 F.3d
1162.
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but also raised additional considerations unique to elementary and
secondary assignment programs.
Additionally, Justice Kennedy's dissent in Grutter foreshadowed
his critical concurrence in Parents Involved, in which the actual opera-
tion of an admissions policy or assignment plan became essential. In
Grutter, Justice Kennedy faulted the majority for "confus[ing] defer-
ence to a university's definition of its educational objective with defer-
ence to the implementation of this goal."'178  He stated that the
majority had failed to examine how the Law School actually reached
its "critical mass" of students and essentially operated an unconstitu-
tional quota system. 179 According to Kennedy, the Law School failed
to meet its burden of disproving the presumption of an unconstitu-
tional racial classification.18 0 Parents Involved echoes this concern of
taking a school board at its word that its plan is designed to meet a
permissible goal. In Parents Involved, the Supreme Court-and most
specifically Justice Kennedy-seemed to decrease the level of defer-
ence it had previously given to school boards, requiring a critical anal-
ysis of the actual operation of the plan in question.' 8 ' The Court
heavily relied on Gratz and Grutter in reaching its holding in Parents
Involved, modifying its analysis in specific ways to suit the K-12
context.
III. PARENTS INVOLVED: THE DECISION ITSELF
Parents Involved addressed both the Louisville and Seattle school
districts' public school assignment plans. 182 The Louisville plan used
178 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 388 (2003) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
179 Id. at 389 ("[T] he concept of critical mass is a delusion used by the Law School
to mask its attempt to make race an automatic factor in most instances and to achieve
numerical goals indistinguishable from quotas."). After examining exactly how the
admissions policy operated to achieve its "critical mass" and the result of that opera-
tion, Justice Kennedy noted that the narrow fluctuation in the percentages of each
race admitted per year and the close correlation between the racial breakdown of
applicants and admitted students suggested that the Law School did not engage in
individual consideration. See id. at 390-91.
180 It seems thatJustice Kennedy, then, would not be in complete agreement with
Justice Powell's assertion in Bakke that when a program is facially race-neutral, a court
will not assume that the university operates it as a cover for the equivalent of a quota
and will instead presume good faith on the part of the university. See Regents of the
Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 318-19 (1978) (opinion of Powell,J.). Instead,
Justice Kennedy was concerned with the actual implementation and result of the pol-
icy, not its facial neutrality.
181 See infra notes 228-31 and accompanying text.
182 The Seattle School District first implemented its plan in 1998. See Parents
Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1,127 S. Ct. 2738, 2746 (2007). Under
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race in both elementary and secondary student assignments and trans-
fer requests, and aimed to keep the racial balance of schools between
fifteen percent and fifty percent black students. 183 Louisville, unlike
Seattle, operated a legally segregated system in the past, but was found
to have eliminated the vestiges of segregation in 2000 when a district
court ordered the dissolution of the desegregation decree under
which the school had been operating.1 84
The question before the Supreme Court in Parents Involved, then,
was "whether a public school that had not operated legally segregated
schools or has been found to be unitary may choose to classify stu-
dents by race and rely upon that classification in making school
assignments. ' 185 In its precedent-setting and controversial ruling, a
majority of the Court answered the question in the negative.1 8 6 The
opinion can be seen as answering two separate questions: (1) can a
school board assert a compelling interest in diversity, and (2) were the
plans at issue narrowly tailored to pass strict scrutiny? A majority of
the Court answered the first question with a "yes" (through Justice
Breyer's dissent and Justice Kennedy's concurrence), while a majority
of the Court answered the second question with a "no" (through
Chief Justice Roberts' plurality opinion and Justice Kennedy's concur-
rence). In light of this configuration, the Court did not definitively
close the door on the use of race in assignments in K-12 public
education.
this plan, incoming Seattle high school students ranked their high school choices in
order of preference and were assigned to their selections based on availability; if a
certain high school had been oversubscribed, a series of tiebreakers was employed to
determine school assignments. One of those tiebreakers was based on race. See id. at
2747. The Seattle School District enrolled approximately forty-one percent white stu-
dents, and fifty-nine percent "non-white" students, including African Americans,
Asians, Latinos, and Native Americans. See id. at 2746 & n.2. If an oversubscribed
school was not within ten percent of the district's racial balance, students who could
help the high school achieve the desired racial balance would be assigned to the
school, while those who would add to the imbalance would not be assigned to their
school of choice. See id. at 2746. Notably, Seattle never operated a legally segregated
school system, and its tiebreaker was employed to remedy the effects of identifiable
racial housing patterns. See id. The Seattle School District undertook its voluntary
busing measures not because of prior suits for Fourteenth Amendment violations, but
in order to prevent threatened lawsuits by civil rights groups for ineffective integra-
tion efforts. See Cassandra Tate, Busing in Seattle: A Well-Intentioned Failure, HIsTORY
LINK.ORG, Sept. 7, 2002, http://www.historylink.org/essays/output.cfm?file-id=3939.
183 Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2749.
184 See Hampton v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 102 F. Supp. 2d 358, 382 (W.D.
Ky. 2000).
185 Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2746.
186 See id. at 2751-54, 2759-60.
FULFILLING THE PROMISE OF BROWN?
A. Is Diversity a Compelling Interest in K-12 Education?
Chief Justice Roberts' opinion never definitively answered the
first question. 18 7 Instead, Roberts merely enumerated what legitimate
interests the school boards had not asserted1 88 (interests in remedying
the effects of past dejure segregation1 89 and diversity in higher educa-
tion, as upheld in Grutter'90). Chief Justice Roberts believed that the
plans, in effect, operated to foster a compelling interest in racial bal-
ancing, "an objective [the Supreme] Court has repeatedly con-
demned as illegitimate."1 9'
This part of Chief Justice Roberts' opinion was not joined by jus-
tice Kennedy, because it suggested two possible interpretations of the
compelling nature of diversity in lower education: either that diversity
187 Roberts stated that "[t]he debate [over the benefits of diversity in schools] is
not one we need to resolve ...because it is clear that the racial classifications
employed by the districts are not narrowly tailored to the goal of achieving the educa-
tional and social benefits asserted to flow from racial diversity." Id. at 2755 (plurality
opinion).
188 For Seattle, the asserted interest was "to reduce racial concentration in schools
and to ensure that racially concentrated housing patterns [did] not prevent nonwhite
students from having access to the most desirable schools," id. at 2755 (plurality opin-
ion), and for Louisville, the asserted interest was "to educate its students 'in a racially
integrated environment."' Id. Chief Justice Roberts found, however, that neither
school district made it clear how its plan's strict racial percentages were aimed at
reaching the benefits of this type of diversity. See id. at 2756.
189 Id. at 2752 (majority opinion) (citing Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 494
(1992)). The school districts here did not claim either interest; Seattle had never
operated segregated schools, and Louisville was found to operate a unitary system. See
id.
190 Id. at 2753. The Court delineated the limits of Gntter, explaining that "in light
of 'the expansive freedoms of speech and thought associated with the university envi-
ronment, universities occupy a special niche in our constitutional tradition,"' and
therefore Gruttes diversity did not reach the elementary and secondary assignment
plans at issue. Id. at 2754 (quoting Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 329 (2003)).
Additionally, Gnlte's diversity interest was one of "'highly individualized, holistic
review,"' and not an effort to achieve pure racial balancing. Id. at 2764 (plurality
opinion) (quoting Grutter, 539 U.S. at 337). Therefore, neither Seattle nor Louisville
asserted a previously judicially recognized compelling interest in this case.
191 Id. at 2755 (plurality opinion).
Accepting racial balancing as a compelling state interest would justify the
imposition of racial proportionality throughout American society, contrary
to [the Court's] repeated recognition that "[a]t the heart of the Constitu-
tion's guarantee of equal protection lies the simple command that the Gov-
ernment must treat citizens as individuals, not as simply components of a
racial, religious, sexual or national class."
Id. at 2757 (alteration in original) (quoting Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 911
(1995)).
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in elementary and secondary education is not a compelling interest
(the interpretation with which Justice Kennedy disagreed and which
caused him to abstain from joining this line of reasoning) ,192 or that
the Seattle and Louisville school districts may have asserted a compel-
ling interest, but failed the narrow tailoring prong of the analysis. 193
To the extent that the plurality opinion can be read to say that there is
not a compelling interest in diversity in secondary and elementary
education, Chief Justice Roberts' opinion is not controlling for the
future of race in K-12 education. Justice Kennedy's opinion paves the
way for the use of race in future school assignment plans, giving hope
to school board members to "come together as a community" and to
"improve and go forward" with new plans.194 Justice Kennedy found
that both the Louisville and Seattle school districts identified a com-
pelling interest in increasing diversity, including the avoidance of
racial isolation. Kennedy stated that "[d]iversity, depending on its
meaning and definition, is a compelling educational goal a school dis-
trict may pursue." 195 In his impassioned concurrence, Justice Ken-
nedy wrote, "To the extent the plurality opinion suggests the
Constitution mandates that state and local school authorities must
accept the status quo of racial isolation in schools, it is, in my view,
profoundly mistaken.' 96
The compelling interest in diversity in education is also explicitly
endorsed as a compelling interest in Justice Breyer's dissent, which
recognized that a school district may assert a compelling interest in
diversity-an interest comprised of three essential elements: a histori-
192 See Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2791 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment).
193 The latter suggestion seems to be supported by Chief Justice Roberts' state-
ments that "the plans here are not tailored to achieving a degree of diversity necessary
to realize the asserted educational benefits; instead the plans are tailored .. to 'the
goal established by the school board of attaining a level of diversity within the schools
that approximates the district's overall demographics,"' id. at 2755-56 (plurality opin-
ion) (citation omitted), and "[t]o the extent the objective is sufficient diversity so that
students see fellow students as individuals rather than solely as members of a racial
group, using means that treat students solely as members of a racial group is funda-
mentally at cross-purposes with that end," id. at 2759. Chief Justice Roberts appears
to have indicated here that a certain type of diversity aimed at reaching demonstrated
educational benefits may be a compelling interest; however, Roberts never explicitly
identified this interest in his opinion.
194 What School Board Members Are Saying, COURIER-JOURNAL.COM, June 29, 2007,
http://www.courier-journal.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20070629/NEWSOI /
70629006/0/NEWSO1.html.
195 Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2789 (Kennedy,J., concurring in part and concur-
ring in the judgment).
196 Id. at 2791.
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cal and remedial element (righting the consequences of past segrega-
tion), an educational element (overcoming the adverse effects of
segregated education), and a democratic element (producing an envi-
ronment representative of the "pluralistic" society that children grow
to experience). 197 This means that a majority of Supreme CourtJus-
tices would allow a school district to assert diversity as a compelling
interest under strict scrutiny analysis.
B. Were the Plans Narrowly Tailored to Pass Strict Scrutiny?
Despite Justice Kennedy's disagreement with the plurality over
the possible nonexistence of a compelling interest, Kennedy agreed
that the plans in these cases were not narrowly tailored to achieve a
compelling government interest, meaning that a majority of the Court
found that the plans failed the strict scrutiny analysis.19 8 The part of
Chief Justice Roberts' opinion that was joined by Kennedy cited the
minimal effect that race had on the assignments as a reflection of a
lack of narrow tailoring, suggesting that other means would have been
more effective in achieving the stated goals. 199 Additionally, Roberts
invoked Grutter, contrasting the negligible impact of race in the Louis-
ville and Seattle plans with the necessity of race in Michigan's law
school assignments. 20 0 Moreover, a majority of the Court recognized
that while narrow tailoring requires a "'serious, good faith considera-
tion of workable race-neutral alternatives,' "201 both Seattle's and Lou-
isville's school districts failed to show that they seriously considered
other plans. 20 2 According to Justice Kennedy, classifications based on
197 Id. at 2820-21 (Breyer,J., dissenting).
198 See id. at 2792-93 (Kennedy,J., concurring in part and concurring in the judg-
ment) ("I join Part IlI-C of the Court's opinion because I agree that in the context of
these plans, the small number of assignments affected suggests that the schools could
have achieved their stated ends through different means.").
199 See id. at 2759 (majority opinion). In Seattle,
[i]n over one-third of the assignments affected by the racial tiebreaker, then,
the use of race in the end made no difference, and the district could identify
only 52 students who were ultimately affected adversely by the racial
tiebreaker in that it resulted in assignment to a school they had not listed as
a preference and to which they would not otherwise have been assigned.
Similarly, Jefferson County's use of racial classifications has only a mini-
mal effect on the assignment of students.... Jefferson County estimates that
the racial guidelines account for only 3 percent of assignments.
Id. at 2759-60.
200 See id. at 2760.
201 Id. (quoting Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 339 (2003)).
202 See id.
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race can only be considered legitimate "if they are a last resort to
achieve a compelling interest. ' 20 3 Despite the fact that both districts
claimed there was no other way to avoid racial isolation than through
their respective assignment plans, neither party proved this assertion
to be true. 20 4 Accordingly, the plans were found to violate the Equal
Protection Clause. 205
IV. PARENTS INVOLVED: THE DECISION'S IMPACT
After Parents Involved, school districts have been left to sort
through the court's ruling to determine what plans will now pass mus-
ter under constitutional guidelines. How can race still be used in
assigning students to schools, if at all? What interests can a school
assert as "compelling" after the decision? More importantly, how can
schools preserve racial and ethnic diversity without violating the Equal
Protection Clause?
While the opinion seems ambiguous at times, several clear
requirements and prohibitions have emerged to give guidance to
school districts in developing race-conscious school assignment plans.
This Note provides a list of suggestions for school districts to follow in
attempting to adhere to the constitutional requirements concerning
the use of race in education after Parents Involved.
A. Requirements of a Constitutional Plan
1. School Districts Must Identify a Compelling Interest
The compelling interest requirement, necessitated by a strict
scrutiny analysis, is still a constitutional requisite. Two compelling
interests that the Court has clearly recognized in the past are remedy-
ing the effects of past societal discrimination 20 6 and diversity in higher
education.20 7 There also exists a third possible alternative. The plu-
rality opinion in Parents Involved never actually forecloses the option
of diversity in elementary and secondary schools as a compelling gov-
ernment interest, and both Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion and
203 Id. at 2792 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
204 See id.
205 See id. at 2746 (majority opinion).
206 See id. at 2742 (citing Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 494 (1992)). Additionally,
Justice Kennedy stated that "[t]he Court has allowed school districts to remedy their
prior dejure segregation by classifying individual students based on their race." Id. at
2796 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (citing N.C.
State Bd. of Educ. v. Swann, 402 U.S. 43, 45-46 (1971)).
207 See id. at 2742 (majority opinion) (citing Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 328
(2003)).
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Justice Breyer's dissenting opinion 20 8 explicitly allow school boards
the opportunity to assert diversity in education as a compelling gov-
ernment interest. A majority of the current Supreme Court appears
to endorse this understanding of a compelling interest.
The concept of diversity is ever-elusive, but can be described as
having both racial and nonracial components. Justice Kennedy
explained the compelling interest at issue in terms of race, ethnicity,
and economic background, as well as other demographic factors, spe-
cial talents, and needs.20 9 Justice Breyer described a compelling inter-
est in diversity
as an interest in promoting or preserving greater racial "integra-
tion" of public schools .... [This means] eliminating school-by-
school racial isolation ....
... It is an interest in teaching children to engage in the kind
of cooperation among Americans of all races that is necessary to
make a land of three hundred million people one Nation. 210
Justice Breyer also lauded the educational benefits of integration,
explaining that integration lowers the achievement gap between
blacks and whites, and "the earlier that black students are removed
from racial isolation, the better their educational outcomes." 2 11 More
importantly, Justice Breyer saw diversity as a crucial factor in prepar-
ing children to become conscientious citizens, stating that the com-
pelling interest at issue "includes an effort to create school
environments that provide better educational opportunities for all
children; . . . to help create citizens better prepared to know, to
understand, and to work with people of all races and back-
208 Justice Breyer's dissent stated:
In light of this Court's conclusions in Grutter, the "compelling" nature of
these interests in the context of primary and secondary public education
follows here afortiori. Primary and secondary schools are where the educa-
tion of this Nation's children begins, where each of us begins to absorb
those values we carry with us to the end of our days. AsJustice Marshall said,
"unless our children begin to learn together, there is little hope that our
people will ever learn to live together."
Id. at 2822 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 783
(1974) (Marshall,J., dissenting)). Justice Breyer was joined by Justices Ginsberg, Sou-
ter, and Stevens in his dissent.
209 See id. at 2797 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
210 Id. at 2820-21 (Breyer,J., dissenting).
211 Id. at 2821 (citing Maureen T. Hallinan, Diversity Effects on Student Outcomes:
Social Science Evidence, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 733, 741-42 (1998)).
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grounds . . . . If an educational interest that combines these three
elements is not 'compelling,' what is?"' 212
2. School Districts Must Narrowly Tailor the Use of Racial
Classifications to Achieve the Asserted Compelling Interest
A strict scrutiny analysis also examines a program's practical
application to determine if the program is narrowly tailored to
achieve the state's asserted compelling interest. Before Parents
Involved, the Court's decisions in Bakke, Grutter, and Gratz governed
the narrow tailoring analysis of race use in public school admissions.
However, these decisions applied to racial classifications in higher
education; the issue of race-based admissions programs in secondary
and elementary schools had never been examined by the Court. It is
necessary, therefore, to determine what Parents Involved left intact of
the Bakke, Gratz, and Grutter opinions in terms of their applicability to
K-12 education, and what the majority changed.
The majority claimed that "the present cases are not governed by
Grutter."213 However, the majority made this statement in a specific
context, asserting that Gratz and Grutter were unique only in their rec-
ognition of a university's claim to a specific type of compelling interest
in broad-based diversity.2 14 Therefore, K-12 schools cannot rely on
the type of broad-based educational diversity that encompasses "'the
expansive freedoms of speech and thought associated with the univer-
sity environment.' '"215 However, while Gratz and Grutter were pushed
aside for purposes of the compelling interest analysis, they still apply
to the narrow tailoring analysis of raced-based programs, as this analy-
sis is the same for universities and for K-12 institutions. Narrow tailor-
ing merely requires that the program at hand is aimed at achieving a
legitimate compelling interest.
In Parents Involved, Chief Justice Roberts' opinion repeatedly
invoked both Grutter and Gratz in its constitutional analysis. Roberts
recalled Grutter-and its demand for individualized review in a nar-
rowly tailored program-in examining the scope of the use of race in
the Louisville and Seattle plans.216 He faulted both plans for failing to
consider race as one of many factors to further the broad idea of diver-
sity that was at issue in Grutter, instead, making race the factor. 217 Simi-
212 Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2823 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
213 Id. at 2754 (majority opinion).
214 See id.
215 Id. (quoting Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 329 (2003)).
216 See id. at 2753.
217 Id.
22o8 [VOL. 83:5
FULFILLING THE PROMISE OF BROWN?
larly, Roberts' opinion invoked Gratz in comparing its
unconstitutional admissions program to the Louisville and Seattle
plans, finding that all three failed to "'provide for a meaningful indi-
vidualized review of applicants' but instead rel [ied] on racial classifica-
tions in a 'nonindividualized, mechanical' way."218 The majority,
therefore, still relied on the "individualized review" component of the
narrow tailoring inquiry established in Grutter and Gratz.2 19 Nowhere
in Parents Involved did the majority explicitly alter its narrow tailoring
analysis. Rather, Parents Involved clarified to what extent Grutter and
Gratz may be invoked in a strict scrutiny analysis of voluntary K-12
integration efforts. These cases are still controlling in the sense that
they may be applied to narrow tailoring analyses, 220 but only in the
ways in which they were applied in Parents Involved, which itself will
control future analyses of race use in lower education admissions.
This idea is supported by Chief Justice Roberts' invocation of
Grutter to suggest that the use of race must somehow be necessary to
achieve the compelling governmental interest: "In Grutter, the consid-
eration of race was viewed as indispensable in more than tripling
minority representation at the law school-from 4 to 14.5 percent."2 2 1
Additionally, Roberts relied on Grutter in stating that narrow tailoring
requires "'serious, good faith consideration of workable race-neutral
alternatives.' " 222 It appears, then, that individualized review, an ele-
ment of necessity, and good-faith examination of alternative plans are
requirements for the narrow tailoring of lower education assignment
plans.
However, not all of the elements of Grutter's narrow tailoring
analysis apply to K-12 education; rather, some seem to be merely sug-
218 Id. at 2753-54 (quoting Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 276, 280 (2003)
(O'Connor, J., concurring)).
219 Even though the majority realized that the school boards did not assert the
same compelling interest at issue in Grutter, narrow tailoring still requires Grutter's
component of individualization. Because individualized consideration for applicants
in a non-merit assignment system is inherently different than consideration in a merit
based system, the inquiry for K-12 education focuses more on the decisiveness of race
in the assignment process-race cannot be used in a mechanical way that is contrary
to the concept of individualized review. See id. at 2753-54.
220 Justice Kennedy stated in his concurrence that "[i]f the dissent were to say that
college cases are simply not applicable to public school systems in kindergarten
through high school, this would seem to me wrong," and deemed Grutter's opinion
"controlling." Id. at 2794 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
221 Id. at 2760 (majority opinion) (citing Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 320
(2003)).
222 Id. (quoting Grutter, 539 U.S. at 339).
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gested and not mandated, or inapplicable. Specifically, while Grutter
required that race-conscious admissions policies be limited in time,223
Parents Involved was silent on the issue of time limits for race-conscious
assignment plans. 224 The Grutter requirement reflected the Court's
concern that race classifications can be dangerous and must be used
sparingly and with caution. 225 The Grutter Court suggested that this
concern could be alleviated in university admissions "by sunset provi-
sions in race-conscious admissions policies and periodic reviews to
determine whether racial preferences are still necessary to achieve stu-
dent body diversity."2 26
The Court's silence on the issue in Parents Involved suggests that
these concerns may be inapplicable to non-merit-based student assign-
ments. This explanation appears highly likely, considering that the
goal of university affirmative action programs is to attract more minor-
ity applicants so that race-conscious admissions policies will eventually
be unnecessary to achieve diversity, while this is not so in K-12 educa-
tion. Rather, the use of race in K-12 assignments will remain neces-
sary so long as societal reasons for segregation remain; because
segregation is often due to racial housing patterns and other factors
not attributed to student choice, a more extensive use of race might
be necessary to achieve the desired diversity. 227
Additionally, after Parents Involved, a new addition to the narrow
tailoring analysis may be called for: the requirement that school
boards be prepared to explain precisely how an assignment plan
works, including in what ways assignments are made and how and
223 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 342.
224 The only mention of remedies limited in time was found in Justice Kennedy's
concurrence, which did not invoke Grutter.
[A]llocation of benefits and burdens through individual racial classifications
was found sometimes permissible in the context of remedies for de jure
wrong. Where there has been dejure segregation, there is a cognizable legal
wrong, and the courts and legislatures have broad power to remedy it. The
remedy, though, was limited in time and limited to the wrong.
Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2796 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment).
225 See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 342.
226 Id.
227 The argument has been made that a-sunset provision in a K-12 system would
be hard to imagine because segregation in that area of education is due largely to
housing patterns-which is not the same type of problem facing university admis-
sions-and cannot be averted by the temporary use of race in the same way the
problems in university admissions can be. See ChristopherJ. Sullivan, Note, Grutter
Effects: Implications for "Re-Desegregation" of Public Education in Georgia?, 22 GA. ST. U. L.
REV. 1031, 1045-46 (2006).
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when race is used. 228 Justice Kennedy explained that "the inquiry into
less restrictive alternatives demanded by the narrow tailoring analysis
requires in many cases a thorough understanding of how a plan
works." 229 Kennedy faulted the Louisville plan for its failure to
explain just how it employed its classifications:
Jefferson County in its briefing has explained how and when it
employs these classifications only in terms so broad and imprecise
that they cannot withstand strict scrutiny .... [I]t fails to make
clear, for example, who makes the decisions; what if any oversight is
employed; the precise circumstances in which an assignment deci-
sion will or will not be made on the basis of race; or how it is deter-
mined which of two similarly situated children will be subjected to a
given race-based decision.230
Kennedy similarly found error in the Seattle plan for failing to
"explain why, in a district composed of a diversity of races, with fewer
than half of the students classified as 'white,' it has employed the
crude racial categories of 'white' and 'non-white' as the basis for its
assignment decisions."2 3  With that in mind, after Parents Involved, it
appears a school board must be able to explain exactly how and why
its racial goals are achieved.
3. Permissible Strategies
Aside from elucidating the guiding legal principles an assignment
plan must satisfy to pass strict scrutiny analysis, Justice Kennedy listed
several illustrative strategies that would be permissible means of
achieving integration. 23 2 Such constitutionally sanctioned suggestions
228 It has been suggested that Grutter and Gratz revealed the Court's adoption of a
"Don't Tell, Don't Ask" approach to individualized consideration: if universi-
ties don't tell how much weight they give to race by quantifying racial prefer-
ences, then courts won't ask probing questions about whether the
preferences are differentiated and not excessive. If, however, universities do
tell, then courts will conduct a searching review of the admissions program,
examining whether preferences are in fact differentiated and not excessive.
Ayres & Foster, supra note 170, at 559. However, Justice Kennedy's concurrence
makes it apparent that "Don't Tell, Don't Ask" is no longer an option, see supra notes
198-204, nor was it an option for Kennedy under Grutter, in which his dissent
reflected the need for a searching review of admissions statistics to discover the effects
of policy designed to reach a "critical mass" of minority students. See Grutter, 539 U.S.
at 389-91 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
229 Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2789 (Kennedy,J., concurring in part and concur-
ring in the judgment).
230 Id. at 2789-90 (citation omitted).
231 Id. at 2790-91.
232 See id. at 2792.
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are a helpful starting point for any school district in developing volun-
tary integration strategies. Those suggestions include the following.
a. Strategic Site Selection of New Schools
Admittedly, selecting sites for new schools is an infrequent occur-
rence, yet when the opportunity arises, certain techniques may be
used to promote integration. Such methods include locating new
schools in population centers or in designated growth areas, or reno-
vating existing sites to establish new schools. 23 3 The location of
schools in these areas is designed to attract minority students to the
new facilities and improve the educational benefits of such students.
b. Drawing Attendance Zones with General Recognition of
the Demographics of Neighborhoods
In many large cities, when attendance is decided based upon
where a student lives in a district, segregated housing patterns result
in segregated schools. This can be avoided through the use of
software designed to take into account a district's demographic, socio-
economic and racial and ethnic composition, and easily calculate the
effect of attendance boundary changes within the district.23 4
c. Allocating Resources for Special Programs
Such special programs include magnet schools, as well Interna-
tional Baccalaureate, advanced placement, or bilingual/dual educa-
tion programs. The creation of these types of programs may be
extremely useful in attracting minority students to apply to schools
outside of their residential areas.235
d. Recruiting Students and Faculty in a Targeted Fashion
This can be accomplished by holding information sessions, open
houses, mentoring programs, and door-to-door outreach initiatives in
predominantly minority neighborhoods. Similarly, schools can pro-
233 See NAT'L GOVERNORS ASS'N CTR. FOR BEST PRACTICES, ISSUE BRIEF: INTEGRATING
SCHOOLS INTO HEALTHY COMMUNITY DESIGN 3-4 (2007), http://www.nga.org/Files/
pdf/0705SCHOOLSHEALTHYDESIGN.PDF.
234 See NAACP LEGAL DEF. & EDUC. FUND, INC., STILL LOOKING TO THE FUTURE:
VOLUNTARY K-12 SCHOOL INTEGRATION 36 (2008), http://www.naacpldf.org/con-
tent/pdf/voluntary/StillLooking-to-the FutureVoluntaryK-12_SchoolIntegra-
tion; _A Manual for Parents, Educators andAdvocates.pdf [hereinafter NAACP
LEGAL DEF.].
235 See id.
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vide incentives for minority teachers to select particular locations for
employment to increase each school's diversity.236
e. Tracking Enrollments, Performance, and Other Statistics by
Race
The collection of such data, the reporting of which is often
required under the Federal No Child Left Behind Act of 2001,237 will
help school districts identify schools that are struggling in achieve-
ment, as well as demonstrate the effects of racial isolation on student
success.
238
f. If Necessary, a More Nuanced, Individual Evaluation of
School Needs and Student Characteristics That Might
Include Race as a Component
This suggestion appears to be more difficult to evaluate in the
K-12 setting. Indeed, Justice Kennedy stated that this approach
"would be informed by Grutter, though of course the criteria relevant
to student placement would differ based on the age of the students,
the needs of the parents, and the role of the schools." 23 9 In an ele-
mentary setting, individualized consideration does not take the form
of the individualized consideration of a university admission's pro-
gram. However, such consideration may be possible in special pro-
grams such as magnet schools, to which students are required to
apply.240
g. Economic Integration
Although not explicitly endorsed by Justice Kennedy, economic
integration has been championed by some as an effective alternative
to race-based integration strategies. The purpose of economic inte-
gration is twofold. First, income levels often correlate with race, and
can therefore be a viable substitute for race or ethnic origin.2
41
Indeed, minority students are almost three times as likely to be low-
236 See id. at 36-37.
237 Pub. L. No. 107-110, 115 Stat. 1425 (2002) (codified in scattered sections of 20
U.S.C.).
238 See NAACP LEGAL DEF., supra note 234, at 37.
239 Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1,127 S. Ct. 2738, 2793
(2007) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
240 See NAACP LEGAL DEF., supra note 234, at 38.
241 SeeJonathan D. Glater & Alan Finder, Diversity Plans Based on Income Leave Some
Schools Segregated, N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 2007, at A24.
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income as white students. 2 4 2 Second, economic integration helps to
promote achievement by placing poorer students in schools with
more experienced teachers, or students who are more likely to moti-
vate classmates to succeed. 243 Additionally, wealth classifications are
not suspect and therefore not subject to an exacting strict scrutiny
analysis. 244
A successful example of such integration is the school district of
Wake County, North Carolina. After its economic integration sys-
tem-which capped the percentage of low income students at each
school in the county to forty percent-was implemented in 1997, the
percentage of black students who scored at their grade level in state
reading tests rose from forty percent (in 1995) to eighty-two percent
(in 2006).245 However, studies have shown that the correlation in stu-
dent success rates is not related to integration between blacks and
whites per se, but between poor blacks and middle-class whites, which
makes economic integration a seemingly more beneficial option in
terms of student success rates than racial integration alone. 246 There-
fore, Justice Kennedy's opinion and the option of socioeconomic inte-
gration leave many choices available to searching school districts after
the decision.
B. Prohibitions
Several clear prohibitions to student assignment plans have also
become apparent, and school districts should be wary of employing
any of the following tactics.
1. School Districts Cannot Allow Race to Be Decisive in and of
Itself
The majority explained that the narrow tailoring analysis allows
race to be used when it is part of a broad scheme to expose students to
242 See RICHARD D. KAHLENBERG, CENTURY FOUND., ISSUE BRIEF: A NEW WAY ON
SCHOOL INTEGRATION 7 (2006), http://www.tcf.org/publications/education/school
integration.pdf.
243 See Glater & Finder, supra note 241.
244 See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973).
245 See Glater & Finder, supra note 241. It is important to note, however, that
some less rigorous programs have met with less success. For example, San Francisco
uses an economic integration system, but does set in place a minimum or maximum
percentage of low-income students for each school, and allows student choice in
school assignment and transfers. Additionally, San Francisco only uses economic sta-
tus as a tiebreaker, and therefore undersubscribed schools are not affected by the
plan. See KAHLENBERG, supra note 242, at 9.
246 See KAHLENBERG, supra note 242, at 5.
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an expansive definition of diversity. Like the Michigan undergradu-
ate admissions plan that was declared unconstitutional in Gratz, the
Louisville and Seattle plans did not allow for meaningful review of
applicants, but mechanically relied on racial classifications so that race
was determinative for some students. This kind of dispositive racial
classification is not constitutionally permissible. 247
2. School Districts Cannot Limit the Concept of Diversity to
White/Nonwhite or Black/Nonblack Terms
"'We are a Nation not of black and white alone, but one teeming
with divergent communities knitted together with various traditions
and carried forth, above all, by individuals.'" 248 The majority made it
clear that a plan's view of diversity must be "'broadly diverse.' "249
Indeed, one reason the Seattle plan was struck down was because of its
binary concept of diversity, labeling students "white" and "nonwhite."
Under the plan, a school in which fifty percent of the students were
Asian-American, fifty percent were white, and zero percent were Afri-
can-American, Native-American, or Latino, would be considered
"diverse," while a school in which thirty percent of the students were
Asian-American, twenty-five percent were African-American, twenty-
five percent were Latino, and twenty percent were white would not be
considered "diverse.' '250 This type of grouping does not serve a
broader goal of diversity.
Diversity, as described by the Court, encompasses more than just
a binary racial divide. In Bakke, Justice Powell established a definition
of diversity that furthers a compelling interest, which the Court later
endorsed in Gratz: "The diversity that furthers a compelling state
interest encompasses a far broader array of qualifications and charac-
teristics of which racial or ethnic origin is but a single though impor-
tant element."251 Notably, to qualify for the benefits of affirmative
action plans in the United States, individuals must usually fall into one
of four broad racial categories: Black, Asian, Hispanic, or Native
247 See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738,
2753-54 (2007).
248 Id. at 2754 (quoting Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 610 (1990)
(O'Connor, J., dissenting)).
249 Id. (quoting Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 329 (2003)).
250 See id.
251 Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 315 (1978) (opinion of
Powell, J.). In Gratz, the Court stated, "The admissions program Justice Powell
described, however, did not contemplate that any single characteristic automatically
ensured a specific and identifiable contribution to a university's diversity." Gratz v.
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 271 (2003).
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American. 252 "This 'ethno-racial quadrangle' has emerged as our
quasi-official definition of what it means to be a 'minority' in the
United States. '253 However, controversy has arisen over this even
broader idea of "minority" than just black and white, which excludes,
for example, members of the Caucasian race that are of Middle East-
ern origin, French Acadians, Hasidic Jews, and many other under-
represented groups. 254 From the debate concerning the proper
definition of "minority" in the United States today, it is abundantly
clear that a white/nonwhite or black/nonblack concept of diversity is
all too limited.
3. School Districts Cannot Use Demographic Statistics to Define
Diversity or Set a Quota in Place
The plurality opinion disparaged each school board's definition
of diversity for mirroring the racial makeup of each of the districts'
demographic areas. Both plans called for an arbitrary racial make-up
that reflected the racial composition of their districts without explain-
ing why those percentages were needed to achieve the stated benefits
of diversity. 25 5 Instead of diversity, the plurality found this to be racial
balancing.256
Additionally, Justice Kennedy's dissent in Grutter suggests that this
kind of balancing is unconstitutional. Justice Kennedy found that the
majority failed to look at the practical application of the Law School's
admissions policy in attaining its critical mass. In finding a "narrow
fluctuation" between the percentages of admitted minorities, and the
close correlation of the racial breakdown of admitted minorities to
those in the applicant pool, Justice Kennedy considered this to be a
potentially suspect use of race, and required the Law School to rebut
252 Sean A. Pager, Antisubordination of Whom? What India's Answer Tells Us About the
Meaning of Equality in Affirmative Action, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 289, 303 (2007).
253 See id.
254 See id. at 303-12.
255 Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2755-56 (plurality opinion).
256 See id. at 2758-59.
[The school districts] offer no definition of the interest [in diversity] that
suggests it differs from racial balance. ("Q. What's your understanding of
when a school suffers from racial isolation? A. I don't have a definition for
that"); ("I don't think we've ever sat down and said, 'Define racially concen-
trated school exactly on point in quantitative terms.' I don't think we've ever
had that conversation"); ("Q. How does the Jefferson County School Board
define diversity... ?" "A. Well, we want to have the schools that make up the
percentage of students of the population").
Id. at 2759 (plurality opinion) (citations omitted).
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that inference. 257 "Whether the objective of critical mass 'is described
as a quota or a goal, it is a line drawn on the basis of race and ethnic
status,' and so risks compromising individual assessment." 258
Therefore, a school district may not use racial balancing in
assigning students for the purely aesthetic purpose of achieving stu-
dent bodies that mirror the racial makeup of the area. Whether a
quota is express or implied, if a correlation is found between
demographics of a school district's schools and the demographics of
its attendance area, the school board will need to show that its means
of assignment did notjettison individual consideration in the process.
4. School Districts Cannot Use the Defense of Benign Motives
Parents Involved reaffirmed the proposition, established since
Bakke,259 that motive is irrelevant in a strict scrutiny analysis. The plu-
rality opinion stated that the argument that different rules should gov-
ern policies meant to include rather than exclude has never been
accepted.260 Chief Justice Roberts wrote:
The reasons for rejecting a motives test for racial classifications
are clear enough. "The Court's emphasis on 'benign racial classifi-
cations' suggests confidence in its ability to distinguish good from
harmful governmental uses of racial criteria. History should teach
greater humility . . . . '[B]enign' carries with it no independent
meaning, but reflects only acceptance of the current generation's
conclusion that a politically acceptable burden, imposed on particu-
lar citizens on the basis of race, is reasonable."
26 1
Equipped with the foregoing recommendations, school districts
should not find the task of creating constitutionally acceptable assign-
ment plans after Parents Involved so daunting. Since the 2007 deci-
sion, the Jefferson County Board of Education has considered the
various mandates and prescriptions at the center of the Parents
Involved decision and begun the process of revising its student assign-
ment plan. The city is aiming to preserve its commitment to diversity
while adhering to these newest constitutional guidelines.
257 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 390-91 (2003) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
258 Id. at 391 (quoting Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 289
(1978) (opinion of Powell, J.)).
259 See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 298 (opinion of Powell, J.).
260 Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2764 (plurality opinion). While Justice Kennedy
did not join in this part of the opinion, the historical precedent of the failure to
accept the defense of benign motives has not been overturned and is thus still good
law.
261 Id. at 2765 (quoting Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 609-10 (1990)
(O'Connor, J., dissenting)).
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C. Constitutional Compliance: Louisville's Response to the Decision
In the wake of Parents Involved, Louisville was charged with bring-
ing its public school assignment program into compliance with the
Court's interpretation of the standards of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. Ironically, a policy that was once the source of community-wide
riots had become a definitive characteristic of the community. The
busing policy was even lauded as the source of Kentucky's 2001 status
as the most integrated state for blacks. 2 62 ManyJefferson County par-
ents and students demonstrated their disappointment after the ruling,
imploring the school district to continue its efforts to instill its stu-
dents with an appreciation for diversity. 263
Months after Parents Involved, the community was still experienc-
ing its after-effects. 264 School Board administrators worked at a steady
and determined pace to implement an assignment system that fell
within the constitutional guidelines of the Parents Involved ruling. The
Board attempted this with the aid and direction of DistrictJudge John
Heyburn, who stated that the Supreme Court decision "allows the dis-
trict to adopt any plan it wants by any date-as long as it doesn't use
race to assign individual students to schools."265 The Board itself
262 See GARY ORFIELD & CHUNGMEI LEE, THE CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT, HARVARD UNIV.,
BROWN AT 50: KING'S DREAM OR PLESSY'S NIGHTMARE? 2 (2004), available at http://
www.civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/research/reseg04/brown50.pdf.
263 Commentaries printed in the Reader's Forum of the CourierJournal included
numerous remarks on the subject. See, e.g., Allison Koch, Letter to the Editor, Cou-
RIER-J. (Louisville, Ky.), Aug. 19, 2007, at H2 ("I experienced Louisville public schools
first-hand and appreciate the number of lessons I learned outside the classroom
about acceptance and diversity .... [My high school] taught me how to be careful
and conscious without judging others. Interacting with students and teachers of dif-
ferent backgrounds than I had gave me knowledge that I could not have learned
otherwise. Public schooling helped me realize I don't need to fear what is different,
but rather embrace it."); Jodie Zoeller, Letter to the Editor, COURIER-J. (Louisville,
Ky.), Aug. 19, 2007, at H2 ("I implore Jefferson County's new superintendent and
school board to continue their efforts to integrate our school system.... The cultural
and real-world relevance of an integrated education will stick with our children much
longer than Shakespeare and Euclid.").
264 Interestingly, in July 2007, the attorney who litigated the case against the
School Board filed a motion imploring Judge John Heyburn of the Western District of
Kentucky to hold the officers of the Jefferson County School Board in contempt,
claiming that the Board's 2007-2008 assignment plan violated the Supreme Court's
summer ruling. The motion was immediately denied by Heyburn, who stated that the
School Board "need not respond to such an outrageous motion, couched in such
unprofessional language." Chris Kenning, Motion Against JCPS Rejected, COURIER-J.
(Louisville, Ky.), July 28, 2007, at Al.
265 Chris Kenning, Schools' Course Since Race Ruling OK'd, COURIER-J. (Louisville,
Ky.), Aug. 1, 2007, at Al.
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interpreted the Supreme Court's decision not as a requirement that
the assignment plan be "color blind," but that it avoid using racial
classifications unless all other means have been exhausted. 266
The Louisville School Board extracted what it believed to be a
"moral imperative" from Parents Involved, citing both Justice Breyer's
dissent 267 and Justice Kennedy's concurrence 268 to conclude that the
county must maintain its commitment to integrated education.2 69
Superintendent Berman's message to the community before the start
of the 2007-2008 school year echoed the hope of the Board and the
citizens of Jefferson County for the future of public education:
As we start a new school year .... I am personally inviting, encour-
aging and even challenging this community to become more
involved in your public schools.
When schools are able to engage parents and the community
in support of their children's learning beyond bake sales and school
fundraisers to being full partners in the education of their children,
the children are winners. That is the kind of commitment I am
asking for-to support our children and youth. 270
That commitment is one that the Board tried to honor in its
response to Parents Involved. The city has always been proud of its
integration efforts and while no such moral imperative has been cast
upon the city by the Supreme Court as such, officials feel that integra-
tion is a defining feature of the city's schools. 27 1 The board has cre-
ated a new permanent plan for the 2009-2010 school year, as well as
266 See Quicktime Video: U.S. Supreme Court Ruling: What Does It Mean for
JCPS? (Jefferson County Public Schools 2007) [hereinafter What Does It Mean for
JCPS?] (on file with author).
267 See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738,
2822 (2007) (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("Primary and secondary schools are where the
education of this Nation's children begins, where each of us begins to absorb those
values we carry with us to the end of our days. As Justice Marshall said, 'unless our
children begin to learn together, there is little hope that our people will ever learn to
live together."' (quoting Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 783 (1974) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting))).
268 See id. at 2797 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judg-
ment) ("This Nation has a moral and ethical obligation to fulfill its historic commit-
ment to creating an integrated society that ensures equal opportunity for all of its
children. A compelling interest exists in avoiding racial isolation, an interest that a
school district, in its discretion and expertise, may choose to pursue. Likewise, a dis-
trict may consider it a compelling interest to achieve a diverse student population.").
269 See What Does It Mean for JCPS?, supra note 266.
270 Sheldon H. Berman, JCPS Needs Your Help This Year, COURIER-J. (Louisville,
Ky.), Aug. 13, 2007, at A8.
271 Louisville Mayor Jerry Abramson believed that "diversity has helped make Jef-
ferson County one of the top public school systems in the country." Local Reactions to
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an interim plan to take effect during the 2008-2009 school year only.
The permanent plan, which uses a combination of race, family
income, and education to assign students, will be voted on in May
2008.272 The plan separates the county into two areas: one below the
district's average income and education levels with a higher-than-aver-
age minority population, and one in which either the income or edu-
cation level is above the district's average, or the student minority
population is below the average. 273 The plan requires schools to
enroll at least fifteen percent and no more than fifty percent of stu-
dents from the low-income, low-education, and high-minority
group.274 Superintendent Berman believes the new plan is constitu-
tional in light of Parents Involved, stating, "Our objective is to maintain
schools that are racially, ethnically and economically diverse," and
"[iit's a model based on geography, not race. '2 75 Additionally,
"[a] lthough the proposal still uses race as one factor in student assign-
ments, it is not applied directly to individual students. '" 276
In order to ensure the effectiveness and legality of its new plan,
the board consulted with national desegregation experts,277 officials
Desegregation, COURIER-JOURNAL.COM, Jan. 29, 2008, http://www.courier-journal.com/
apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20080129/NEWSO 05/80129001 /0/NEWSO1.
272 See Antoinette Konz & Chris Kenning, Income, Race, Education Criteria for Assign-
ments, COURIER-J. (Louisville, Ky.), Jan. 29, 2008, at Al.
273 See id. "According to the district, the average household income among school
families is about $41,000; the average education level is a high-school diploma with
some college; and the district's minority enrollment is 48 percent." Id.
274 See id. The proposal offers two alternatives for grouping elementary schools in
student assignments. The first would be based on current elementary clusters, which
are noncontiguous. In the "'Non-Contiguous Boundary Scenario,' the elementary
clusters would be similar to how they are now, with minor changes. There would be
nine clusters, with five to 13 schools each. About 1,700 students would have to change
schools." Id. The second would be based on geographic areas, with clustered schools
bordering each other. "In the 'Contiguous Boundary Scenario,' current clusters of
elementary schools would be rearranged so that schools in the same cluster would all
touch each other. There would be seven clusters of 10 to 14 schools each. About
3,500 students would have to change schools." Id.
275 Id.
276 Id. Nevertheless, the lawyer who prosecuted the case against the board dis-
agrees, stating, "On the surface, without seeing a detailed review of the JCPS pro-
posed plan, this new student assignment seems to be unconstitutional," and "I urge
JCPS to immediately submit this to Judge Heyburn for his review to avoid costly litiga-
tion." Id.
277 Louisville Superintendent Berman sought the help of Gary Orfield (director of
the University of California at Los Angeles's Civil Rights Project), as well as Ohio State
University law professor John Powell (executive director of the Kirwan Institute for
the Study of Race and Ethnicity), lawyer Anurima Bhargava (from the NAACP's Legal
Defense Fund), and demographer Ron Crouch (from the Kentucky State Data
[VOL. 83:52220
FULFILLING THE PROMISE OF BROWN?
from other school systems that have ceased using race in school
assignments, 278 and its numerous legal counsel. Louisville administra-
tors and lawyers weighed plans by their "impact on diversity, school
choice and the number of students who would have to switch schools,
among other factors. ' 279 After announcing the plan to the commu-
nity, district officials now seek public input. Between January and the
May vote on the plan, the school board will assess public opinion-
including the views of parents, teachers, and other community lead-
ers-through community forums, polls, and focus groups.2 80
In light of the principles established in Parents Involved, the new
Louisville plan is arguably constitutional. As a primary matter, race is
not the only issue involved in the constitutional analysis of the new
plan. The school board is also using economic factors in its assign-
ments, which the Supreme Court has stated are not subject to a strict
scrutiny analysis.281 The addition of a wealth classification in Louis-
ville's new plan makes its constitutionality much more probable. Fur-
thermore, the limited use of race in the new plan is highly likely to
pass a strict scrutiny analysis. First, the school district has identified a
compelling interest in diversity, which a majority of the Supreme
Court found to be a legitimate interest. 28 2 The district has also broad-
ened its definition of diversity so that minority status includes not only
African Americans, but all nonwhite students. 28 3 Now, 47.9% of the
district's 98,000 students are considered minorities. 2 4
The school district has also fixed many problems which caused its
plan to fail the majority's narrow tailoring analysis. The majority
faulted the old plan for its dispositive, mechanical, nonindividualized
Center). See Chris Kenning, District Consulted National Experts, COURIER-J. (Louisville,
Ky.), Jan. 29, 2008, at A8.
278 The School Board and its experts interviewed officials from school districts
including Cambridge, Charlotte, Berkeley, and Wake County. See id.
279 See id. The group considered plans including neighborhood assignment, open
enrollment, lotteries, and geographical assignments. See id. Superintendant Berman
rejected the ideas of a neighborhood assignment plan and a free-choice plan, stating
that such assignments would lead not only to racial segregation, but also segregation
by income and other socioeconomic factors. See Antoinette Konz, Berman: Simple
Plans Would Segregate, COURIER-J. (Louisville, Ky.), Jan. 29, 2008, at A8. The former
option would also lead to the reassignment of more than 20,000 students. See id.
280 See Kenning, supra note 277.
281 See, e.g.,James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137, 141 (1971).
282 See supra notes 187-97.
283 See Konz & Kenning, supra note 272.
284 See id.
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use of race, 285 its limited notion of diversity, 286 the "minimal impact"
of its use of race, 28 7 and the board's failure to show good-faith consid-
eration of workable race-neutral alternatives.2 88 The plurality also
voiced concern at the plan's mirroring of racial demographic percent-
ages of the county, which the Court found to be essentially a form of
racial balancing. 2 9
In the new plan, race is not dispositive like it was in the old plan,
and a student's race cannot be used to systematically deny him or her
an assignment or transfer request. Race is considered along with
income and education in making such decisions. Diversity has been
broadened to encompass more than the two categories of "black" and
"other." The plan itself takes into account race-neutral factors, and is
more akin to Grutters individualized admissions policy in which race is
one of many factors to be considered in diversity, and which was
found to pass a strict scrutiny analysis. Furthermore, the use of race
has been limited in the new plan and does not resemble the "extreme
measure" of race reliance of the previous plan.2 90 This more
restricted use is presumably necessary to achieve diversity, although
there is not yet any data showing the actual impact that race will have
on future student assignments.
The old plan employed a ratio requiring between fifteen percent
and fifty percent black enrollment, while the new plan employs a ratio
requiring between fifteen percent and fifty percent low-income, low-
education, high-minority group enrollment. When does a plan that
was patently unconstitutional-essentially a form of racial balancing
rejected by the plurality2 9 -become constitutional by the mere substi-
tution of three variables for one? An answer can be found in one of
two explanations. Either the new plan will pass a strict scrutiny analy-
sis of its more narrow use of race, or, alternatively, the plan will be
judged by-and pass-a less demanding level of scrutiny.
285 See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738,
2753-54 (2007).
286 See id. at 2754 ("It is hard to understand how a plan that could allow these
results can be viewed as being concerned with achieving enrollment that is 'broadly
diverse."').
287 Id. at 2760.
288 See id.
289 See id. at 2755 (plurality opinion).
290 See id. at 2756.
291 See id. at 2757 (" [W] orking backward to achieve a particular type of racial bal-
ance, rather than working forward from some demonstration of the level of diversity
that provides the purported benefits, is a fatal flaw under our existing precedent. We
have many times over reaffirmed that '[r]acial balance is not to be achieved for its
own sake.'" (quoting Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 494 (1992))).
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While race is subject to strict scrutiny, education level and income
are not. For example, plans that are based solely on income, such as
that of Wake County, North Carolina, avoid being subjected to strict
scrutiny, and can be justified by a showing that income-level integra-
tion has a significant impact on student achievement. However, the
plan here mixes one classification subject to strict scrutiny (race) with
two other elements that are not reviewed under such scrutiny, to cre-
ate the final factor of admission: residence in one of two areas. How
would the Court analyze a plan consisting of these elements if chal-
lenged under the Equal Protection Clause? Potentially, the use of
race itself would still be analyzed separately under a strict scrutiny
analysis. It is arguable that the limited use of race in such a situation
will be found constitutional. The school board no longer uses race
alone to assign students on individual bases. The impact of the use of
race is reduced so that race alone cannot be used to decide admis-
sions or transfers. Instead, geographic area-based on a combination
of race, education, and income-will. The plan has remedied many
of the plurality's concerns with the original plan's lack of narrow tai-
loring, and the new plan may very well find support by that same
plurality.
Even if the plan would not pass a plurality analysis, however, it
would most likely meet Justice Kennedy's approval. The plan incorpo-
rates Justice Kennedy's recommendations for formulating a narrowly
tailored plan by using such suggestions as drawing attendance zones
based on demographic factors, and using a more nuanced, individual-
ized consideration of students. 2 92 Therefore, a majority of Justices-
Justice Kennedy and the Parents Involved dissenters-would likely find
this new plan to pass strict scrutiny.
Alternatively, the plan may be looked upon with a lesser level of
scrutiny. The plan uses a calculation that is ultimately based on geo-
graphic location within the district to assign students. Geography
alone is not analyzed under a strict scrutiny standard.2 93 If the plan
were viewed under a lesser level of scrutiny, the Court would much
more easily find the plan's use of its classification to be justified. So
long as Louisville will be able to explain the necessity of the factors
used in its new plan, such a plan should be able to withstand constitu-
tional scrutiny. Regardless of the potential level of scrutiny to be
applied, the new plan seems to propose a very interesting test case for
292 See id. at 2792-93 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
293 But see infra notes 300-04 and accompanying text (describing redistricting
cases invoking scrutiny questions).
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the Supreme Court. The Louisville School Board has taken Justice
Kennedy at his word that race may still be used to achieve diversity,
and has used his suggestions for guidance in formulating a new plan.
Finally, the Louisville School Board has also taken guidance from
a very similar plan used in Berkeley, California, which assigns neigh-
borhoods diversity ratings based on racial composition, family
income, and education levels. 294 The Berkeley plan has withstood
legal challenges at the state superior court level and would likely with-
stand strict scrutiny at the constitutional federal level for the same
reasons as Louisville's new plan.295
The board's interim proposal is slightly more problematic.2 96
The plan uses geography instead of race in assigning students, requir-
ing that elementary schools have between fifteen percent and fifty per-
cent of enrolled students from residential areas with minority
populations of forty-five percent or more.29 7 The school board
became concerned about its district's level of integration after a dozen
or so schools fell outside of the desired racial enrollment of fifteen
percent to fifty percent black students following Parents Involved.298
The geographic solution to this problem raises some constitutional
issues. It has been suggested that geographical classifications are not
suspect and therefore not subject to strict scrutiny.299 However, the
Supreme Court has issued several decisions addressing voter redistrict-
ing in which geographical distinctions were challenged as proxies for
racial classifications. These decisions are informative in the present
294 See Konz & Kenning, supra note 272. For a more detailed description of the
Berkeley plan, see Berkeley Unified Sch. Dist., BUSD Student Assignment Plan/Pol-
icy, http://www.berkeley.net/index.php?page=student-assignment-plan (last visited
Mar. 13, 2008).
295 See Am. Civil Rights Found. v. Berkeley Unified Sch. Dist., No. RG06292139,
slip op. at 16-18 (Cal. Super. Ct. Apr. 6, 2007), available at http://www.nsba.org/
cosa2/clips/docs/ACRF v BUSD.pdf.
296 In fact, the attorney who challenged the original plan in Parents Involved has
challenged this plan as being unconstitutional, as well. See Antoinette Konz, Schools'
Interim Policy Opposed, COURIER-J. (Louisville, Ky.), Feb. 6, 2008, at B1.
297 See Antoinette Konz, Temporary Desegregation Plan Approved, COURIER-J. (Louis-
ville, Ky.), Feb. 1, 2008, at Al. "The plan would apply to children entering first grade,
students new to the district or who have moved, and those requesting transfers." Id.
298 See id.
299 See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Some Effects of Identity-Based Social Movements on Con-
stitutional Law in the Twentieth Century, 100 MICH. L. REV. 2062, 2283 (2002) ("Doctri-
nally, the contrast between race-based classifications (strict scrutiny) and sex-based
ones (intermediate scrutiny) operates to prefer remedial preferences for women over
remedial preferences for racial minorities; easiest to defend would be preferences
based upon income, geography, or another factor that would produce diversity along
several dimensions without deploying a suspect identity trait.").
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situation, although it is unclear just how these principles would be
applied to a case of the geographical assignment of students under
the Equal Protection Clause.
In Shaw v. Reno,300 the Supreme Court recognized that while laws
that are express in their racial discrimination easily violate the Equal
Protection Clause, laws that appear racially neutral but operate in
practice as racial classifications may also violate the Clause: "These
principles apply not only to legislation that contains explicit racial dis-
tinctions, but also to those 'rare' statutes that, although race neutral,
are, on their face, 'unexplainable on grounds other than race."' 30 1
The Court concluded that "redistricting legislation that is so
extremely irregular on its face that it rationally can be viewed only as
an effort to segregate the races for purposes of voting" may create a
cause of action under the Equal Protection Clause.30 2 This proposi-
tion was later confirmed by the Court in Miller v. Johnson303 and Bush
v. Vera.304
While these cases apply to voter redistricting laws and not student
assignment policies, they still raise pertinent issues. If the Louisville
school district's assignments made by geographical area are inexplica-
ble by anything other than on the basis of race, and race is found to
be the predominant factor in the geographical assignments, the school
board might find itself in dangerous, uncharted territory. The board
must be careful not to allow its geographical assignments to operate as
de facto racial classifications. Nevertheless, because the school board
is no longer systematically denying individual students assignments
based on race alone, this interim option is a safer alternative to the
old plan. Fortunately, this temporary plan will be replaced with the
presumably constitutionally permissible race-education-income plan
the following year.
300 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
301 Id. at 643 (quoting Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252,
266 (1977)).
302 Id. at 642.
303 515 U.S. 900, 905 (1995) ("Applying this basic equal protection analysis in the
voting rights context, we held that 'redistricting legislation that is so bizarre on its face
that it is unexplainable on grounds other than race .... demands the same close
scrutiny that we give other state laws that classify citizens by race.'" (alterations in
original) (quoting Shaw, 509 U.S. at 644)).
304 517 U.S. 952, 959 (1996) ("For strict scrutiny to apply, the plaintiffs must prove
that other, legitimate districting principles were 'subordinated' to race. By that, we
mean that race must be 'the predominant factor motivating the legislature's [redistrict-
ing] decision.'" (alterations in original) (quoting Miller, 515 U.S. at 916)).
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CONCLUSION
Although the Supreme Court's ruling in Parents Involved has been
in effect for a short time, it is already clear that its impact will be felt
for some time to come. 30 5 The issue of race in education has long
been a live topic of judicial discussion, and Parents Involved has by no
means laid the issue to rest. If anything, the plurality decision has
only clouded the issue for school boards in its failure to explain
lucidly how to effectively implement constitutional assignment plans
that assert compelling interests and are narrowly tailored to achieve
those interests. By examining Justice Kennedy's concurrence and the
Supreme Court precedents in place before Parents Involved, this Note
has aimed to eliminate much of that confusion.
Ironically, Parents Involved marked Brown's coming full circle-
only in a way that no one could have anticipated. In 1955, the
Supreme Court issued an order to school districts "to achieve a system
of determining admission to the public schools on a nonracial
basis. '"30 6 That mandate was reissued in Parents Involved by Chief Jus-
tice Roberts who, invoking Brown II, concluded that "the way to stop
discrimination on the basis of race is to stop discriminating on the
basis of race."30 7 Today, Louisville is again trying to live up to that
mandate, while setting an example for similarly situated school dis-
tricts to follow.
305 In fact, shortly after-and as a result of-the decision, one school district
found itself having to defend against a motion to reopen a First Circuit case, decided
before Parents Involved, in which its race-based assignment plan was upheld as consti-
tutional. The case was Comfort v. Lynn School Committee, 418 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2005). For
an in-depth discussion of the motion to reopen the case, which was ultimately denied,
see Posting of Lyle Denniston to SCOTUSblog, http://www.scotusblog.com/wp/
uncategorized/massachusetts-parents-school-plea-denied (July 31, 2007, 10:16 EST).
306 Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown I1), 349 U.S. 294, 300-01 (1955).
307 Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738,
2768 (2007) (plurality opinion).
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